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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents an analysis of the social 
phenomenon of power and develops some ideas concerning the 
relevance of power for organization decision. The organiza­
tion is viewed as a power structure which approaches its 
objectives through the process of decision. The decision 
process includes all those activities related to the formu­
lation and promulgation of organizational policy.
The purpose of this study is achieved through research 
of published findings of behavioral scientists in the fields 
of political science, social psychology, sociology, and 
economics. From these separate disciplines are gleaned the 
factors pertinent to an analysis of power as a determinant 
of organization dynamics.
An examination of behaviorist writings reveals that 
power is the ability to alter the probability of occurrence 
of a desired pattern of behavior. Power is expressed as an 
inequality resulting from differential abilities to reinforce 
value systems of actors in the social relation. The direc­
tion and magnitude of the inequality is determined from the
control of resources which are perceived to be sources of 
value satisfaction by social interactors. Resources are 
classified as institutional, if they are generalized, and 
personal, if they are specialized, sources of satisfaction.
Organization structure is described as a hierarchy of 
officially designed roles modified by personal values of role 
occupants as determined in social roles incongruent with 
official prescription. Legitimate power, or authority, is 
distributed through delegation to centers in the hierarchy. 
Deviations from the authority structure develop from less 
than perfect integration of values of organization members. 
The degree of deviation from official prescription is the 
basis for classification of power structures.
The formal organization attains its goals through the 
distribution of power. The nature of objectives and the 
magnitude of power determine whether organization potential 
is expended to promote conformity or creativity. The risk of 
promoting one to the exclusion of the other is cited as the 
opportunity cost to the organization. Opportunity costs are 
based on the nature of the dependency relation between the 
organization and its members and are measured in units of 
value satisfaction.
.A
Decision-making is viewed as a series of relationships
viii
among decision-maker, environment, actions, and goals. These 
relationships develop in a dynamic setting characterized by 
changes in one or more of the elements of decision. Decision 
is effective or ineffective with reference to the ability of 
the organization to initiate changes in these relationships 
or to compensate for changes of exogenous origin.
The organization decision-maker includes all those 
persons who, by participation, are capable of altering the 
results of decision. Participation in decision is desired 
by the organization within the limits of role prescription 
established by rational design. Participation is bounded by 
member's values which are founded on social roles both inter­
nal and external to the organization. Decision is made 
effective and organization objectives are achieved by trans­
forming undifferentiated potential into participative action.
It is concluded that decision is effected through 
participation elicited by reinforcement of values of organiza­
tion members. Differential ability to reinforce values is 
the source of power and power is the ability to alter proba­
bilities of occurrence of desired events. Effective 
organization decision is a continuous process evolving from 
rationally oriented choice, circumscribed by socially deter­
mined boundaries, situated in a power actuated structure.
ix
INTRODUCTION
In modern society most activities take place within 
the framework of structured relationships called "organiza- 
tion." The necessary condition for organization is inter­
action between two or more persons who perceive that their 
individual desires can best be satisfied through the combina­
tion of personally possessed capabilities or resources. The 
structured relationships are not once and for all prescrip­
tions but are "rules of the game" which are adaptable to 
changing situations and the changing desires of the partici­
pants. The organization is formalized by the development of 
objectives for the combination and the acceptance of these 
objectives by the contributing members. Agreement as to 
organization and the procedure for attaining these objectives 
is invariably achieved by compromise. Compromise involves 
the sacrifice of some degree of individual decisional auton­
omy. It follows that the decisional autonomy which is sur­
rendered by the individuals is the essence of organization.
In turn, it may be inferred that an organization is essential­
ly a mechanism of decision.
x
Decision, as compromise, rests on the ability of 
participants to retain decisional autonomy. Stated differ­
ently decision is ultimately the net effect resulting from 
the interaction of individuals with varying abilities to 
influence. Traditionally, influence in decision has been 
relegated to the realm of subjectivity and intuition. 
Objectivity in decision continues to attract the major share 
of the attention of decision theorists and analysts. While 
obviously true that total objectivity in decision is an ideal, 
it must be acknowledged that the decision making organism or 
organization is never blessed with the total knowledge which 
is required for complete objectivity. If subjectivity must 
remain an integral part of the decision-making process, it 
would appear worthwhile to exert some effort toward its 
clarification. The purpose of this work is to investigate 
and analyze the decision-making process of organizations with 
particular emphasis on the subjective elements expressed in 
terms of power relations.
In order to understand power relations in an organiza­
tional context, it is first necessary to develop the concept 
of power in its generic sense. Chapter I will be devoted to 
deriving some ideas about power from writings in the field 
of political science, psychology, and social psychology.
xi
The writer will attempt to portray power in terms of what it 
is, how it is derived, how it can be measured, and some of 
its conceptual properties. With this insight into the nature 
of power, it is possible to look at the organization in terms 
of power relations.
The organizational aspects of power are proposed in 
Chapter II. Again it is necessary to depend on behaviorists 
for development of the power concept in the structured rela­
tionship of organization. The structure of power in the 
organization is examined in terms of the value patterns of 
members who occupy positions in a role hierarchy. Attention 
will then be given to the structure of power systems and 
some variations in the types of these systems. Further in­
vestigation of organizational power will be directed toward 
understanding the relationship between power structure and 
organizational objectives.
Objectives are formulated and attained through the 
decision-making process. The organizational decision-making 
process is the subject under scrutiny in Chapter III. The 
interaction of the elements of decision and the dynamics of 
the decision process are studied as a background for the 
organizational decision processes. With this background it 
is possible to look into the various types of organizational
structure with the decision process as a guide. Finally the 
role of organization members can be assessed in terms of 
their participation in decision.
In conclusion, the writer will attempt to integrate 
the concepts of organizational power and organizational 
decision and indicate the significance of the integrated con­
cept for administration of formal organization.
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF POWER
The basic characteristic of organization is the inter­
action of individuals with some degree of agreement as to 
organizational purpose and method. Continuing agreement can­
not obtain unless decisions are made and action-programs 
developed. Implied in decision is an element of compromise 
from a plurality of courses of action open to participants. 
Compromise is the process of choice and necessarily.involves 
the use of influence or power.'*' A theory of organization 
can never be complete unless it includes a theory of power.
As Bertrand Russell has stated, "The fundamental concept in 
social science, is Power, in the same sense in which Energy 
is the fundamental concept in physics."2 To understand the
■'■William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich, "Democ­
racy in America: Retrospect and Prospect," in Peter F.
Drucker, jet al., eds., Power and Democracy in America (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 137.
^Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1938), p. 12.
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organization as a social process, it is first necessary to 
gain some insight into the nature of this fundamental con­
cept.
POWER DEFINED
The word "power" as a highly abstract symbol has no 
"meaning" except that which its user wishes to impute to it. 
In various writings in the social and economic realms power 
has been equated with authority, influence, control, force, 
and many other similar terms. In the process of defining 
power it will be necessary to move downward through the 
levels of abstraction to diminish the possible ambiguity of 
the definition. Some of the general applicability of the 
concept may be lost as a result. However, it is expected 
that a workable definition can be derived which will be mean 
ingful in its intended application to organizational analysi 
Power defined as "production of intended effect" or "proba­
bility of change" has certain restrictions which inhibit its 
usefulness in application to the decision process. These 
definitions are developed to help clarify the preferred 
definition of power as a "change in probability."
Production of Intended Effect
Power is most commonly defined as the production of
3intended effect.^ A power relationship under this definition 
consists of man in his environment with some desire for change. 
The "intended effect" always occurs in the environment which 
may include people or things or both. Since the power holder 
is himself a part of his environment, even those adaptive 
changes in the individual may be thought of as changes in the 
environment. The "intended effect" is thus a change in the 
relationship between man and his environment. Power is said 
to reside in the person capable of bringing about this 
changed relationship.
Power exists only with respect to a specific intended 
effect or objective and must be, therefore, a situational 
concept.^ References to the power of the individual are
necessarily restricted to the specific situation and specific
5
objectives of the individual in that situation. He can be 
said to have power insofar as he brings about the desired 
changes in his relationship with his environment. A further
^Ibid., p. 35.
^E. Abramson, H. A. Cutler, R. W. Kautz, and M. Mendel- 
son, "Social Power and Commitment: A Theoretical Statement,"
American Sociological Review, XXIII (1958), 15.
^Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," 
American Sociological Review, XXVII (1962), 32.
4restriction inherent in this definition is that power must 
be exercised before it can be said to exist. This.restric­
tion limits the consideration of power to an ex post facto 
and static appraisal of the concept. This preliminary idea 
of power may best be illustrated by a two-actor relationship 
in which the actors are symbolized by A and B. Under this 
definition, an effect intended by A was accompanied by a 
certain behavior on the part of B which would not have oc­
curred except in the presence of A. A may'then be said to 
have had power which produced his intended effect in the 
observed situation.
Some writers, among them Martin J. Hillenbrand, have 
contended that power is the ability to produce, rather than 
production of, intended effect. Hillenbrand states:
If we define the term (power) in its broadest 
sense as the ability to produce intended effects 
or effects which may possibly be intended, we can 
find scarcely any sphere of human activity where 
it does not exist to a greater or lesser degree.
. . .  The ability to produce intended effects is 
inherent in any system of relationship between 
man and man, or between man and his environment.^
Power, as the ability to produce a desired change, connotes
an absolute quality which proves misleading. A workable
6Martin J. Hillenbrand, Power and Morals (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 4.
5definition must include the idea of power as a probabilistic 
concept.
Probability of Change
Previously, it was stated that power could be thought 
of as the ability of an actor to change the relationship 
between himself and his environment in a given situation. 
Further clarification of this idea came from Max Weber who 
acknowledged the probabilistic nature of the power relation­
ship when he said: "Power is the probability that one actor
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry
out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis
7on which this probability exists." Weber restricts his 
definition to social relationships, but he could just as 
easily have extended it to include man's interaction with 
his environment.
Symbolically, Weber's statement may be expressed as 
the probability that B does x, given that A does w,
P (B, x/A, w) = p, where x is the action on the part of B
Q
which is desired by A, and w is the action of A. Any
7 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organi­
zation (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1947), p. 152.
8Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral 
Science, II (1957), 203-204.
probability, p, that is greater than zero would seem to indi­
cate that A has power over B in that he could influence B to 
act in the manner x by acting in the manner w. The limiting 
assumption of this definition is that B offers resistance to 
A or that the probability of B doing x is always zero unless 
A does w. A more complete statement of the power relation­
ship must include the possibility of occurrence of a desired 
change when actor A takes no action. To understand the
nature of power it is necessary, therefore, to compare the
#>
probabilities of occurrence of the intended effect when A 
does and does not do w.
Change in Probability
At some time in any social relationship there exists 
the possibility that a result desired by a participant is 
achieved without action directed toward bringing about that 
result. In terms of the symbols introduced above, there is 
some probability p^, that the behavior of B will be such that 
an objective desired by A will be realized. Power, there­
fore, cannot be imputed to A on the basis of the probability 
of change. Rather, A's power must be defined as the differ­
ence between the probabilities of certain behavior on the 
part of B in the presence and absence of A. The presence of 
A is expressed as an act, w, of A in the specific context of
7the social relationship with B.
When A does w, there is some probability, p 2 , that B 
will do x resulting in a change desired by A. The proposi­
tions as outlined above could then be stated: 
p 1 = P(B, x/Aw) 
p 2 = P(B, x/A,w)9 
where (B,x) is B does x
(A,w) is A does w
(A,w) is A does not do w
and P (B, x/Aw) is the probability that B does x, given
that A does w.
P (B, x/Aw) is the probability that B does x, given 
that A does not do w.
It follows that the power of A is defined as a change 
in probability, or p 2 - When p 2 exceeds p^, A is said
to have power over B with respect to x; when p 2 = p^, no 
power relationship may be inferred to exist; and when p 2 is 
less than p^, A has negative power with respect to x. Al­
though positive power, p 2 > p 1# is the primary concern of 
this paper, some attention should be given to the conditions 
of negative power, p 2 < p ^ , and zero power, p 2 = p^-
When A does w, and the probability of B doing x is 
decreased, A is said to have negative power over B.
9Ibid,, p. 204.
Observation of reactionary performance would indicate that 
negative power is a valid proposition. Similarly, the propo­
sition of powerlessness, P2 = P^, demonstrates the indepen­
dence of A and B in a specified relationship.
Power, as production of intended effect, connotes a 
direct cause-effect relationship which must be suspect in 
any analysis, although the causal agent in any relation 
certainly must be acknowledged as possessing power. With 
the introduction of probabilities into the definition, power 
becomes more realistically a concept of the future but fails 
to include the possibility of independence in the social 
relation. As the change in probabilities, power exists in 
the relationship only when the participants are interdepend­
ent. However, change in probabilities as presented is limited 
to a static analysis after the changes have taken place.
Many inferences may be made on the basis of changes in proba­
bilities in the past. But the usefulness of power as an 
analytical device is in prediction or the transition from 
past to future. To meet these essential qualifications of a 
useful definition of power, it is proposed that power is the 
ability to change the probabilities of occurrence of a. de­
sired event in a given social context.
Using this definition as a guide, the nature of
power's derivation as well as some of its conceptual proper­
ties will be examined. From this examination, it should be 
possible to formulate some general propositions concerning 
the phenomenon of power in the formal organization.
THE DERIVATION OF POWER
"The foundations of power vary from age to age, with 
the interests which move men, and the aspects of life to 
which they attach a preponderant importance."^-® In this 
statement Harold Lasswell cogently demonstrates that there is 
no universal source of power at a given time, nor is there a 
particular source of power that transcends time. Power is a 
function of the values extant as they are perceived by the 
parties to social interaction. Again, as in defining power 
with reference to particular objectives in a stated situation 
it is possible to view the sources of power only within a 
specific context. That is not to say that some resources do 
not have explicit values, or possess utility, for a large seg 
ment of the human population. It is to say, however, that 
the utility of a specific resource may change with the situ-
f
ation. The possibility of power issuing from a variety of
•*-®Harold D. Lasswell, and Abraham Kaplan, Power and 
Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 86.
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bases would be insignificant "if one kind of resource— say 
wealth or social standing— dominated all others," according 
to Robert Dahl. "But," he continues, "this is not the case 
despite a tradition of economic determinism that runs in a 
straight line from Madison to Veblen, Beard, the Lynds, and
C. Wright Mills."1’1' The sources of power must be found in 
the value systems of people, having unequal abilities to 
influence, engaged in interdependent activity.
Value Systems of Participants
The value system of an individual can best be described 
as a hierarchy of levels of aspiration. The most common 
method of categorizing values is through a dichotomous 
means-end relationship. Some improvement in classification 
is obtained by temporal subdivision of ends into ultimate, 
intermediate,=or immediate. Such a division is suggested by 
the statement of Herbert Simon: "The fact that goals may be
dependent for their force on other more distant ends leads to 
the arrangement of these goals in a hierarchy1— each level to 
be considered as an end relative to the levels below it and
■^Robert A. Dahl, "Equality and Power in American 
Society," in Peter F. Drucker, et al., eds., Power and Democ­
racy in America (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1961), p. 83.
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12as a means relative to the levels above it." In this paper, 
ultimate ends are called values and are seldom, if ever, 
achieved but exist at the horizon as a guide in setting inter­
mediate ends referred to as objectives. Striving for objec­
tives may be thought of as an attempt to "actualize" values 
through available instruments commonly designated as means. 
Through common usage, means has acquired a dichotomous con­
notation which should be avoided. Following Rosen, Levinger,
and Lippitt, any property which has usefulness in obtaining
1 3objectives will be termed a "resource." The hierarchy of 
resources, objectives, and values will serve as a framework 
for discussion of the value system as a source of power.
An individual, by detaching himself from reality, 
might possibly be able to establish an ordered system of 
values which he believes to be permanent and absolute. Man 
in isolation in a stable physical environment might even be 
capable of codifying and ranking a relatively permanent scale 
of values. Changes, however, pose a threat to the perceived 
security of the individual and his values, which determine
■^Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (second 
edition; New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 63.
13Sidney Rosen, George Levinger, and Ronald Lippitt, 
"Desired Change in Self and Others as a Function of Resource 
Ownership," Human Relations, XIII (1960), 187.
12
actions, are adapted to the changed conditions. The inclu­
sion of other individuals in the environment increases the 
likelihood that threatening changes will occur, accompanied 
by a change in values or a change in their ordering. As the 
environment is broadened to include larger numbers of people, 
there may be evidence of some pervasive values which become 
institutions as they are incorporated into individual value 
systems. These institutions, though not uniformly ranked by 
all participants, are the norms by which interaction is 
governed. Institutions, then, are contingent on some over­
lap in the value systems of interacting individuals. The 
greater the overlap or congruency of values of interactors, 
the greater the probability of standardizing all their 
values in terms of any individual value. The tradition of 
economic determinism mentioned above is based on this assump­
tion of highly congruent value systems. To reject economic 
determinism as a final answer to the question of human moti­
vation is not to reject the importance of wealth as a per­
vasive value. Only by rejecting wealth or any other single 
property as a permanent, universal value is it possible to 
investigate the relationship between the value system and 
power.
Two assumptions are basic to the analysis of value
13
systems as the ultimate source of power in the social rela­
tion. First, it must be assumed that every individual places 
value on some relationship with his environment. This rela­
tionship may be as simple and mundane as survival or as 
sophisticated and metaphysical as the possession of omnipotent 
power. It may be restricted to a single value or may be an 
elaborate system of values. Second, there is a scarcity of 
the means by which values are realized. This assumption pre­
cludes the Utopian possibility of each individual satisfying 
his every desire. In striving to obtain objectives determined 
by their personal value patterns, individuals must compete 
for the essential resources which are in limited supply.
Power, as defined above, requires that there be some 
"connection" or dependency between the interacting parties.
It has been suggested that this connection is found in over­
lapping value systems of individuals. It was further sug­
gested that value system determines objectives which are 
accomplished through use of resources and that values tend to 
become institutionalized through interaction. For a better 
understanding of how power is derived from the value system 
some consideration will be given to the possession of valued 
resources and the institutionalized values of social inter­
actors .
14
Possession of Valued Resources. Resource, as used 
here, refers to any property which may be useful to its 
possessor or others in the process of satisfying their indi­
vidual value systems. As a possessor of the resource, the 
individual must be capable of using the resource in his 
personal pursuits and either permitting or denying its use 
to others. It should be noted that resource is not restrict­
ed to material properties but may be physical or mental at­
tributes as well. Physical attributes may include such 
properties as brute strength and dexterity, while mental 
attributes refer to the ability of the individual to recog­
nize the facility of physical and material resources for 
satisfaction of values of oneself and others. Ihe resource 
owner may use the resource in directly satisfying the dic­
tates of his value system, or he may permit its use by others 
in exchange for certain behavior which enhances his chances 
of gaining objectives. Power resides in the resource owner 
to the extent that the resources he possesses are essential 
to the satisfaction of others.
When the individual can use his resources directly to 
change his relationship with his physical environment he may 
be said to possess power. Man's struggle with the elements 
"has engendered the belief that power over things was the
15
14proper pursuit of man." However, power over things, where 
things are material properties, may lead to an accumulation 
of resources and hence to power over people. If unrestrained 
accumulation of resources is permitted, as advocated by the 
proponents of rugged individualism, effective control over 
the lives of people comes to be centered in the economic 
system.15
While it may be true that power is centered in the 
economic system, there exists a peripheral area of noneconom­
ic resources which are determinants of power. These re­
sources are particularly important in situations where 
material possession approaches egalitarianism. With economic 
equality, power derives from "the possession cf certain non- 
transferable values."^ Power emanating from unique ownership 
of a physical resource is amply demonstrated by Aristophanes' 
Lysistrata, where the power of woman rules supreme. Knowledge, 
or what passes for knowledge, as a source of power is evi­
denced by the positions of power accorded the magicians and
1 7medicine men of savage c o m m u n i t i e s . F u r t h e r  support for
-^D'Antonio, op. cit., p. 146.
15Ibid., p. 146.
l ^ L a s s w e l l  and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 157.
-^Russell, op. cit. , p. 43.
this proposition comes from Proudhon who writes in Qu-est-ce 
crue la Propriete1: "In any given society, the authority of
man over man varies in inverse proportion to the intellectual
no
development of the society." It might he inferred that 
power is a function of relative resource ownership rather 
than of the absolute level of possession. If all men had the 
same values and equal resources, power would not exist. Ac­
cording to George Catlin, "Only freedom and self-control 
would reign or, if 'reign' be thought here inappropriate,
there would be an anarchy of pre-established harmony, founded
19on free moral choice." Since it is rather unlikely that 
all men will have either completely dissimilar values or 
equal resources, power will maintain a prominent role as a 
behavior determinant in human interaction.
Power was defined earlier as the ability to alter the 
probabilities of occurrence of a chosen outcome. In the 
social relation probabilities are altered by inducing a par­
ticular behavior which will produce a desired result. Sym­
bolically power was shown to be P(B,x/A,w) - P(B,x/A,W), or
18As quoted by George E. Gordon Catlin in "Authority 
and Its Critics," from Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Authority 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958),
p. 126.
^8Ibid.
the probability that B does x given that A does w, minus the 
probability that B does x given that A does not do w. Stated 
in terms of resources, A does w is the equivalent of A grant­
ing B the use of resources which are essential to some objec­
tive of B. A has power over B if he is the exclusive possessor 
of resources which B covets. The amount of A's power is not 
determined by his quantity of resources but by the value 
placed by B on the objective which A can grant or deny by 
virtue of A's possession of resources. Power may then be 
stated as a function of resource possession, given the value 
system of the one over whom power is held. Once again, if 
the value system of participants can be standardized in 
terms of any one resource, power will be a direct function 
of resource ownership.
Resources have been shown to be an important source of 
power. However, possession of resources is no assurance that 
power will accrue to the owner. Power occurs only in inter­
action and depends on the existence of some system of values 
of the participants. Not only must value systems exist, but 
there must be some degree of overlap between systems for 
power to be generated. If the possibility of power increases 
with increasing commonality of values, then attention should 
be turned to the area of institutionalized values.
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Institutionalized Values and Resources. Values which 
are shared by interacting persons over an extended period of 
time are institutions of that particular social relationship.
A resource which may be used by many individuals in attaining 
a variety of values approaches value status and may in turn 
be designated as institution. As values are institutionalized 
the demand for the scarce resources by which they are realized 
is increased and the possessors of these resources can com­
mand a greater "price" by inducing behavior more favorable 
to his objectives for each "unit" of resource that he sur­
renders. If all values were institutionalized and could be 
satisfied through a standardized resource, power might be a 
simple function of resource ownership, provided the order of 
the value of institutions was also institutionalized. It is 
not the intent of the writer to argue the extent of institu­
tionalization but, rather to show institutionalized values as 
a source of power.
As the value systems of social interactors converge, 
the possibility of influenced behavior increases if the 
"state of the arts" or available supply of resources remains 
constant. A, as a possessor of a bundle of resources desired 
by B and C and D, will enjoy an increased probability that B 
does x when A does w. If the probability that B does x is
increased, then A's power with respect to B is increased and 
the increase in power is a function of institutionalization 
of values.
In addition to its significance in the dynamics of 
power development, the idea of institutionalized values will 
be useful later in examining the conceptual properties of 
power. Institutions are the basis of Richard Schermerhorn1s 
statement about power configurations: "Assuming that power
is a dynamic process, we may then ask if it tends to repeat 
itself in easily identified ways. The answer is yes, though 
the patterns may at times overlap. The power process fre­
quently crystallizes into more or less stable configurations
20designated as centers or structures of power."
It has been proposed that the ultimate source of power
is not so much in people, who are a "boundless and indeter-
21minate source of it," but in the values which people bring 
into the social arena. Strangely, then, only he who has 
values may be the subject of power while the power-holder 
need have no values other than power itself. This
20Richard A. Schermerhorn, Society and Power (New York 
Random House, 1961), pp. 17-18.
21Charles W. Hendel, "An Exploration of the Nature of 
Authority," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Authority (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 25.
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Machiavellian conclusion would prove sufficient as an analy­
sis of power if humanity could be divided into power holders 
and power subjects, those with values and those without. The 
more likely case is that value systems diverge, while having 
areas of coincidence, and are held with varying degrees of 
intensity. It was indicated previously that power accrued 
to those who could supply the resources essential to the 
satisfaction of the values of interacting individuals. Actu­
ally, the resource-holder is a potential power-holder until - 
his control of resources is demonstrated by permitting or 
denying their use. A concept including both permission and 
denial is that of sanctions. While the application of sanc­
tions is not a separate source of power, it deserves treat­
ment in conjunction with source as the means by which the 
resource-holder is converted from a potential to an actual 
holder of power.
Sanctions as the Bases of Power
To sanction is generally thought to denote the grant­
ing of approval or support. Yet the plural form, sanctions, 
connotes coercive measures of disapproval. In the explica­
tion of the bases of power, sanctions will be used as an 
inclusive concept with both positive and negative aspects.
The ability to apply sanctions derives from resource
21
ownership, or private property, and control of institutions,
from the public domain. The interdependence of resources
and institutions is suggested by the proposition that the
right to private property, in its material form, is itself
an institution. But the institution, if traced to its
origin, is derived, according to Bertrand Russell from "being
able to decide, by the use of armed force if necessary, who
shall be allowed to stand upon a given piece of land and to
22put things into it and take things from it." The somewhat 
circular reasoning of power as a source of institutions and 
institutions as a source of power will be clarified in a 
later discussion of the transformation of power, a conceptual 
property. It is proposed that power is composed of authority 
which is 'institutionally derived, and influence, which stems 
from personal attributes.
The personal attributes of a power-holder may be cate­
gorized as expertise and charisma. Expertise refers to extra 
ordinary capabilities or knowledge in a particular endeavor 
which will apparently lead to satisfaction of values of 
participants. Charisma is a quality which power-subjects 
impute to an individual whom they perceive to be capable of
^Russell, op. cit. , p. 120.
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removing obstacles in the path of value satisfaction, Closely 
related to charisma and expertise is the concept of "halo ef­
fect. " Charismatic and expert properties are generalized to 
include situations which may be dissimilar to the situation 
in which charisma and expertise are founded. These personal 
qualities of the individual may be, in some instances, the 
only basis for sanctions. More generally, the ability to em­
ploy sanctions will develop from both personal and institu­
tionalized qualities.
Sanctions may be either a perceived or an actual
ability to reinforce the value systems of social interactors.
The power subject may erroneously perceive the ability of one
with whom he interacts to invoke sanctions, but the ability
• *
of the power-holder to influence is no less great because of 
errors in perception. Accepting sanctions as positive or 
negative, real or perceived, facilitates a classification of 
power in terms of its bases. As is true in any attempt to 
classify, complete independence between categories cannot be 
maintained. The writer has selected the five bases of power 
listed by French and Raven in their article, "The Bases of
Social P o w e r , a n d  collapsed the five into three by
23john R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases 
of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., Studies in 
Social Power (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan
Press, 1959), pp. 155-56.
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including the positive and negative aspects of sanctions.
The three bases are: reward— the ability to reinforce the 
value system, positively or negatively; legitimacy— the right 
to prescribe behavior; and identification— the perceived 
integration of value systems.
Reward. Reward was defined as the ability to rein­
force the value system of others in either a positive or 
negative direction. Viewing the ability to reward in terms 
of actors A and B and their respective acts w and x, the 
acts, w, of A may be thought of as the rewards of B. The 
probability of B doing x, and consequently A's power over B, 
changes with the desirability of w for B and with A's ability 
to perform w. As A actually acts in a manner w, the attrac­
tion of A for B will increase over time, and A will gain the 
power of identification as well as reward power over B. How­
ever, if A promises to do w  in return for an x which B finds 
impossible, or if A promises w which he cannot perform, A 
loses his power over B. B's perception of A's ability to 
reward changes through time with the actual reward ability 
demonstrated by A. A may have a potential for power over B, 
through possession of resources or control of institutions 
valued by B, but A's actual power over B is based on sanc­
tions in the form of reward. Power, in a hedonistic
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perspective, need have no other base, provided pleasure is 
gained or pain avoided by submitting to legitimate authority 
or following an identified leader. To avoid speaking of the 
pleasure of submission or following, legitimacy and identifi­
cation will be treated as separate bases of power.
Legitimacy. Legitimacy was stated to be the right to 
prescribe behavior. From the vantage point of the power- 
holder, all power is legitimate in that the right to pre­
scribe behavior accrues to those who control the reward 
system. This writer takes the position that power is neither 
legitimate or illegitimate but that one base of power, partic­
ularly in the formal organization, is the legitimacy of 
actions. Legitimacy requires that subordinated individuals 
acknowledge the right of superiors to act in a power-produc­
ing way, whether those superiors are natural or supernatural, 
sovereign ruler or general manager. The acknowledgment of 
this right is the equivalent of submission to authority or 
"legitimate power. " Goldhamer and Shils discuss three major 
forms of this ligitimate power:
Legitimate power is 'legal' when the recognition 
of legitimacy rests on a belief by the subordinated 
individuals in the legality of the laws, decrees, 
and directives promulgated by the power-holder; 
'traditional' when the recognition of legitimacy 
rests on a belief in the sanctity of tradition by
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virtue of which the power-holder exercises his 
power and in the traditional sanctity of the 
orders which he issues; and charismatic when the 
recognition of legitimacy rests on a devotion to 
personal qualities of the power-holder.^4
Since the laws, decrees, and directives of the power- 
holder tend to reflect the traditions of the land, legal and 
traditional power may be combined into the singular concept 
of authority. The legitimation of authority, according to 
Robert Presthus, comes about through technical expertise, 
formal role, rapport, and a generalized deference to 
authority. In the one-to-one power relationship of A to B, 
it would be proper to speak of "an authority" rather than 
authority as an institution. An authority derives power from 
expertise or superior knowledge and possibly rapport. Gen­
eralized deference to authority and formal role will be dis­
cussed later in the organizational setting.
Reward power has been shown to require resource-owner- 
ship by which value systems may be reinforced. Legitimate 
power, or authority, on the other hand requires the control 
of institutions accepted by the power subject. The third
^Herbert Goldhamer, and Deward A. Shils, "Types of 
Power and Status," American Journal of Sociology, XLV (1939), 
172.
^ R o b e r t  V. Presthus, "Authority in Organizations," 
Public Administration Review, XX (1960), 88.
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basis of power requires neither of these and may even exist 
without knowledge on the part of the power-holder. Identifi­
cation, as a base of power, may be independently derived or 
may result from satisfaction in a power situation based on 
reward or authority.
Indentification. Identification differs from the 
other bases of power in that active sanctions are not re­
quired on the part of the power-holder. The power subject 
emulates, in a one-to-one relation, and conforms, in a group 
relation, regardless of responses of the power-holder(s). 
Either the power-holder or the power-subject may be unaware 
that identification has taken place. Regardless of the lack 
of knowledge on the part of participants, a power relation­
ship may be said to exist when the behavior of one is modi­
fied by changes in the behavior of the other. It would 
appear that identification would result in impotence rather 
than power except that emulation of behavior is merely an 
instrument rather than an end. The one who emulates does so 
in order to attain the perceived station of the one who is 
emulated. Identification thus leads to a similarity of value 
systems and a potential power-source for the referent. The 
importance of identification as a base of power resides in 
the use of sanctions. If active, rather than passive,
27
sanctions are applied, power is transformed from a potential 
to an actual factor.
Reward, legitimacy, and identification may often occur 
as independent bases of power. However, power developed on 
one basis may increase the opportunities for its development 
from another. Repeated successes in the use of rewards is 
almost certain to lead to closer identification and closer 
identification tends to lead to legitimacy. Over a period of 
time in any social relation power may develop from any one 
or any combination of these three bases.
No specific definition of power or analysis of its 
sources and bases can possibly include all the features of 
this elusive and amorphous phenomenon. It is necessary, 
therefore, to elaborate on the particular characteristics of 
the concept as they pertain to the analysis of the structure 
of organizational decision.
CONCEPTUAL PROPERTIES OF POWER
Some of the properties of power have been developed 
earlier and others have been alluded to in a casual way. The 
list of conceptual properties discussed below is not intended 
to be exhaustive but includes the major characteristics
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essential to the understanding of power as a "universal 
phenomenon in human societies and in all social relation­
ships."26 To emphasize the social aspects of power is not 
to deny that power may be reflexive in the sense of "will" 
power, or that it may exist in a relationship with the 
physical environment. Rather, it is felt that power as a 
personal attribute is important only when it is transferred 
into the social arena, for if it were possible to insulate 
individual power from social interaction, it could increase 
limitlessly without apparent consequence. But the purpose 
of this paper is to promote understanding of the consequences 
of power and not merely to verify its existence. The con­
ceptual properties of this social phenomenon are presented as 
an elaboration of the definition proposed earlier in this 
chapter.
Power is a Property of the Social Relation
Power is a relationship between actors and is not an
27absolute attribute of a single actor. Actor A may be said
26Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," 
American Sociological Review, XV (1950), 730.
27oorwin Cartwright, "A Field Theoretical Conception
of Power," in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., Studies in Social Power
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press,
1959), p. 213.
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to have power over actor B, provided A can alter the proba­
bility with which B will perforin a specific act or set of 
acts. As the set of acts which B will perforin at the option 
of A approaches B ’s total capabilities, the power of A ap­
proaches totalitarianism but only with respect to B. If A 
can maintain his option with any undesignated B (or many 
specific B's), it may be inferred that power is an attribute 
of A. However, even absolute power of A is meaningless un­
less the behavior of the B's is directed toward some objec­
tive of A. Implicit in the relationship between actors is a 
mutual dependence which implies "that each party is in a 
position, to some degree, to grant or deny, facilitate or 
hinder, the other's gratification. Thus it would appear that 
the power to control or influence the other resides in control 
over the things he values. . . . "28 degree of dependency,
and hence the potentiality for a power relation, depends on 
the availability of substitutes or alternative avenues for 
attainment of objectives. The available alternatives are 
most likely to be other social relations, with similar depend­
ency requirements but differing in "costs." "Cost," as used 
here, is opportunity cost measured in terms of value
^Emerson, loc. cit.
i
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satisfaction derived from the particular behavior set re­
quired to maintain the relation.
Power is shown to be a product of a specific relation­
ship between actors, each of whom has certain objectives that 
are mandates of individual value systems. The necessary con­
dition for interaction is some degree of mutual dependency 
between actors for gratification of desires. Close observa­
tion of the social relation not only will reveal that power 
exists, but also will show that it has recognizable dimen­
sions.
Power Has Observable Dimensions
Power exists only as an intervening variable and as 
such cannot be observed or measured directly. It does, how­
ever, have certain properties or dimensions which can be 
inferred from observations of behavior patterns of actors in 
the social relation. According to Bertrand de Jouvenel, 
power may be dimensionally classified as extensive, compre­
hensive, and intensive. In his words: "It is extensive if
the complying B 's are many; it is comprehensive if the 
variety of actions to which A can move the B's is consider­
able; finally it is intensive if the bidding of A can be
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pushed far without loss of compliance." These dimensions 
are essentially the same as those discussed by Dahl and re­
ferred to as extension, scope,and amount.^ A fourth dimen­
sion which should be considered is that of cost. John C. 
Harsanyi suggests that cost is an essential dimension of 
power and defines it in terms of the opportunity cost to the 
actors. The inclusion of the cost dimension in the explica­
tion of power is justified by Harsanyi1s statement that "A's 
power over B should be defined not merely as an ability by A 
to get B to do X [x] with a certain probability p, but rather 
as an ability by A to achieve this at a certain total cost u 
to himself, by convincing B that B would have to bear the
q p
total cost v if he does not do X [x]."
The amount, scope, and extension of power, as poten­
tial, may be roughly approximated from the possession of 
resources and control of institutions that have value for B.
^Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Authority: The Efficient
Imperative," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Authority (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 160.
30Dahl, "The Concept of Power," pp. 201-15.
31John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Op­
portunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining 
Games," Behavorial Science, VII (1962), 68.
32Ibid., p. 69.
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The actual power available to A develops from the ability of 
A to apply sanctions. The use of power, in the final analy­
sis, depends on its expected costs, or the weighted average
of the costs of successful and unsuccessful attempts to alter 
33B's behavior. The significance of the dimensional proper­
ties of power is not restricted to situations in which power 
is actually exerted, since it is often more important to 
evaluate the possible consequences of potential acts than to 
examine the results after commitment.
Power is Potential for Action
The definition of power as an ability to alter proba­
bilities may be re-worded as the ability to choose a desired 
outcome without any change in meaning. Outcomes, or objec­
tives, have been predicated in this analysis on actions of B. 
The actions of B, in turn, have been based on A's potential 
actions as perceived by B. It follows that power is potential 
for action, while action is the esqpenditure of potential to-
•3 / .  ^34ward the realization of some chosen objective. (If power
•^Although the central theme of this paper is "how" 
power enters the decision process, rather than "how much" 
power exists, it is important to note that some sophisticated 
attempts have been made toward the measurement and compara- 
bility of power by Dahl, Harsanyi, Simon and others.
"^Abramson, et al., o£. cit., p. 17.
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is itself a dominant value, there is no reason why the objec­
tive cannot be to increase the potential for action.) The 
implications of power for the decision-making process are 
obvious if decision-making is described as choice-action- 
outcome and power is defined as the ability to choose an out­
come through the property of potential for action.
Power May be Transitive or Intransitive
The proposition that power is a product of the social 
relation and not an absolute attribute of the individual pre­
cludes the possibility of answering the often posed question 
of who the power holders are. Because A has power over B and 
B has power over B-^  does not mean that A has power over B^ 
unless B and B^ both perceive A as being capable of gratify­
ing their individual desires. Power of A will be transitive 
if the resources possessed by A may be generalized to all the 
B's, or if the value systems of the B's are approximately 
congruent. Inversely, deviations in value systems of B's, 
or specificity of resources of A, will lead to intransitivity.
The complete intransitivity of power would have the 
effect of restricting organizational decision to individual 
bargaining. Transitivity, on the other hand, would permit 
the establishment of a power hierarchy with unrestricted 
delegation from the apex to the base. A realistic study of
34
power as a variable in the decision process must take cogni­
zance of the possibility that power may be transitive or in­
transitive.
Power is Transformable and Cumulative
Power exists in numerous forms according to the bases 
from which it springs. Various classifications of power in­
clude such forms as naked power, arising from brute force; 
coercive power, based on severe deprivations or-punishment; 
reward power, derived from ownership of coveted resources; 
legitimate power, entrusted to those who control institu­
tions; and so forth. Classification affords a "closed system" 
concept which conveniently limits investigation to practical 
bounds. But power defies rigid classification because as 
Bertrand Russell puts it, "Power, like energy must be re­
garded as continually passing from any one of its forms to 
any other. . . .  The attempt to isolate any one form of power
(in our day, the economic form), has been a source of errors
35of great practxcal xmportance."
Though power is said to be easily transformed, there
is an intermediate step in the process which should be intro-
\
duced. Power, which is potential, is exercised in one form
•^Russell, pp. cit., p. 12.
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to obtain other potential sources of power. For example, 
naked power can be converted into possession of resources 
which are the source of reward power, which may in turn be 
used to increase brute force, the source of naked power. 
(Fortunately power is not the only value and power is occa­
sionally transformed into sources of immediate and terminal 
satisfaction.)
Implicit in the process of transformation of power is 
the investment of power in other sources of power. Through 
investment, the power base is expanded or potential for
power is accumulated. Power of one type tends to adhere to
37power of other types in a cumulative pattern. These pat­
terns are likely to repeat themselves in relatively stable 
configurations which may be designated power structures.
Power structures have value systems which are strongly orien­
ted toward further accumulation of power. An obvious con­
clusion that can be drawn is that power is the only effective 
control for power, whether the arena be intra-firm or inter­
national.
^ Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley,
1957), p. 70.
Schermerhorn, op. cit., p. 24.
36
This chapter has advanced some ideas ahout the generic 
nature of power and some of its sources and unique character­
istics. The presentation was not intended to be an exhaus­
tive analysis of power in all of its ramifications but was 
designed to establish a background for the organizational 
aspects of power to be developed in Chapter XI.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF POWER
The declared purpose of this paper is to analyze power 
and its application to the decision-making processes of the 
system referred to here as the formal organization. The 
first chapter was devoted to explicating the nature of power 
by developing a definition of the concept in keeping with 
its function as an intervening variable. Power was said to 
be an elusive phenomenon which existed between sources, as 
potential, and outcomes, as actualization. By definition, 
power is the ability to alter the probabilities of occur­
rence of a chosen outcome.
If organization is defined as a combination of indivi­
duals seeking to attain personal goals through interaction, 
and formal organization has the qualification of orientation 
toward attainment of a specific goal, the significance of 
power in its organizational context1 is immediately apparent.
■^-Organizational context as used here refers to the 
boundaries of the formal organization which are defined as 
being at the point of exchange relations with the environ­
ment. The organization exists as a "steady state" of cease­
less activity, with input and output, directed toward a 
specified goal.
37
i
38
Goals, sought through organized activity, both individual 
and collective, are achieved through the use of power. 
Organizational goals are realized through mobilization of the 
capabilities of participants— an act of power depending on 
the ability of the organization to reinforce the value sys­
tems of the individual members. It should be kept in mind 
that both individual and collective goals are defined as
relationships between the actor and the relevant part of the
2external situation in which he acts.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the organi­
zational aspects of power and the relevance of these concepts 
for goal attainment. It is maintained that an organization 
is a network of structured relationships„determined by com­
promise among its members as to what the goals of the 
organization will be and as to the procedures by which they 
will be pursued. It is further maintained that these rela­
tionships and that the resultant network is in essence a 
power network or structure. This study of power in the 
organization is concerned with how organization structures 
are developed and how power is distributed throughout the
^Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Ap­
proach to the Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, I (1956), 64.
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structure, with variations in the types of structures, and 
with the attainment of goals through these structures.
DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
Much of the effort of organization theorists has been 
directed toward developing models of organization structure. 
Emerging from the work of these theorists are two distinct 
types of ideal models which Alvin Gouldner has classified as 
the "rational" model and the "natural-system" model.^ Accord­
ing to Gouldner, the rational model of organization is "a 
rationally conceived means to the realization of expressly 
announced group goals. Its structures are understood as 
tools deliberately established for the efficient realization 
of these group purposes."^' The rational model structure is 
composed of "manipulable parts, each of which is separately 
modifiable with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the 
whole." The natural system model, on the other hand, regards 
organization as a whole, structurally composed of "emergent 
institutions, which can be understood only in relation to the 
diverse needs of the total system. . . .  Organizational
3Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in 
Robert K. Merton, et al., eds., Sociology Today (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1959), p. 404.
^Tbid., p. 405. 3Ibid.
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structures are viewed as spontaneously and homeostatically 
maintained. . . .  The empirical focus is thus directed to 
the spontaneously emergent and normatively sanctioned struc- 
tures in the organization."
Individually, the rationalistic and naturalistic 
models are useful in gaining insight into segments of organi­
zation structure. There is an inherent possibility, however, 
when either model is ignored (or taken as given at some con­
stant value), that "structure" will be identified with the 
most visible characteristics of the organization to the 
neglect of less obvious, but no less important, variables. 
Taken together, the two models may be used to present a com­
prehensive analysis of the organization and its structural 
development as an adaptive, continuing process. This process 
is described here as being based on power, with power, in 
turn, being based on rationalistic and naturalistic varia­
bles.
To analyze structural development, it is necessary to 
regard the process as though it were stationary or were 
chronologically ordered. The three stages of development 
used here are accumulation of potential, establishment of role
6Ibid., pp. 405-406.
hierarchy, and evolution of power hierarchy. Each of these 
stages will he considered in terms of the pertinent sources 
and conceptual properties of power as developed in the pre­
ceding chapter. It should be kept in mind that the stages 
have no particular order but are functionally interrelated.
m
Accumulation of Potential
From its inception, the formal organization has some 
potential for power accruing from the agreement of its mem­
bers as to goals and procedures. The "whole" of the re­
sources which the members agree to contribute is greater than 
the sum of its parts. Or, the individual participants per­
ceive the reinforcement to their value systems to be greater 
when their resources are used in combination with the re­
sources of others. The difference between the whole and the 
sum of the parts is a resource of the organization and, as an 
exclusive, nontransferrable resource, is a source of power.
By using the excess resulting from combination to 
mediate rewards, the organization increases its attractiveness 
to its members. Attractiveness, in turn, promotes identifica­
tion with the procedural aspects of the organization. Through 
acceptance, the procedures become institutionalized and 
legitimized. Adoption of legitimized procedures is the equi­
valent of endorsement of the substantive purpose or value
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system of the organization. Endorsement of the value system 
leads to further identification and finally the institution­
alization of the value system itself.
It may thus be seen that "an" organization has inherent 
potential for the accumulation of power. If the organization 
is the only accessible user of the individuals' capabilities 
(a monopsonist), or is the sole possessor of resources which 
will reinforce the individual's value system (a monopolist), 
the power of the organization with reference to the indivi­
dual will approach the absolute. (Many theorists have, in 
fact, equated decisions to participate with total acceptance 
of existing institutionalized values, and thus regard organi­
zation as an authoritarian hierarchy with little or no 
regard for power.) Since no organization is likely to be 
the sole user of all the capabilities of the individual or 
the sole possessor of the means of reinforcement, the power 
residing in the organization is probably something less than 
total power. Also, power was said to be dependent on the 
value system of the individual and his dominant value of the 
moment might be to avoid exploitation, in which case identi­
fication would be less than complete. Further, if other 
sources of value reinforcement are visible to the individual, 
the power of the organization is limited to a relative rather
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than an absolute function. Says Kenneth Bouiding,
It is not the absolute value of a variable which 
is significant, but the difference between your 
value and that of some other comparable person or 
organization. . . .  This sensitivity to difference 
between one organization and another is an important 
factor in explaining the whole dynamics of 
society. . . .7
It is reasonable to assume that power does accrue 
from combination, since organizations do exist and their 
only justification is to increase the probability of occur­
rence of desired outcomes. Even though power is accumulated 
through reward, legitimation, and identification, it has no 
meaning as long as it remains a "free agent" of the organi­
zation. Power must have structure before it can be used to 
accomplish the purpose for which it and the organization 
were created. Structure is the method by which power is 
distributed in the organization.
Establishment of Role Hierarchy
In the absence of an anarchy of pre-established har­
mony in which each participant knows what is best to do and 
does it, some direction must be given to the efforts of 
organization members. In the formative stage of organization,
7Kenneth Boulding, The Organizational Revolution (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. xxx.
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positions may be established in view of the personal capa­
bilities of the contributors. The parts are authorized by 
the whole to perform specific functions essential to the 
purpose of the whole. As these functions are repeated over 
time, the organization develops expectations about the manner 
in which they will be accomplished. As these expectations 
pervade the organization, they tend to solidify into pre­
scriptions of the position rather than the individual until 
they ultimately evolve into procedural institutions and the 
organization becomes a "system of formal roles that shapes
O
and directs role occupants." The relationship between for­
mal roles may be described as a legitimate power or authority 
relationship, for "when social action and interaction proceed 
wholly in conformity to the norms of the formal organization, 
power is dissolved without residue into authority."
The role hierarchy is seen as the blueprint of effi­
ciency as expressed in the rational model of organization 
cited by Gouldner.^8 The strata of positions which can best 
attain the expressly stated goals is authoritatively
8Melville Dalton, Men Who Manage (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 259.
9Bierstedt, o£. cit., p. 734.
■^Gouldner, pp. cit., p. 405.
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instituted and may be manipulated to meet change by virtue 
of authority placed in those positions. Authority is com­
pletely transitive and consequently can be delegated and re­
delegated from the apex of the hierarchy to the base.
Positions cannot identify, but are identified entirely with 
the organization making power synonymous with authority and 
authority absolute.
To accept unadulterated role hierarchy the partici­
pants must identify with their respective positions and 
accept the offered reinforcements to their value systems with­
out question. The rights of the members are surrendered to 
the prescriptions of the roles, and choice is restricted to 
participation or non-participation. Needless to say, the 
qualifications for a pure role hierarchy are seldom met. 
Positions are filled by people who bring with them some 
values founded in frames of reference outside the organiza­
tion. Consequently, performance in positions is likely to 
deviate from that which is prescribed and authority will be 
circumvented. Advocates of authoritarian organization are 
apt to regard this deviation as dysfunctional, which it may 
well be, but only if the authoritarian prescriptions are 
capable of developing the full potential of the organization. 
The role hierarchy of objective, impersonal power, while
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essential to organizational sustenance, is incomplete insofar 
as it makes no allowance for reinforcement of members value 
systems outside the limits of the organization- The members 
must not have power as a value especially when power goes 
beyond authority.
Evolution of Power Hierarchy
It was demonstrated that power in the role hierarchy 
was limited to legitimate power or authority and was based on 
"submission to a leader in view of his office, that is, to 
an institutional figure."^ The success of the authoritative 
organization is directly dependent on at least three factors: 
first, on the efficiency of the role prescriptions; second, 
on the closeness of fit between the person and the position; 
and third, on the ability of position-holders to reinforce 
value systems of those subordinate to it. Neglect of any one 
factor will assuredly lead to deviations between the author­
ity or role structure and the power structure. The first and 
second factors have received most of the attention of organi­
zation analysts while the third has been underdeveloped. This 
discussion of the power hierarchy is aimed primarily at 
clarifying the total concept of power and its significance
"*'1Schermerhorn, pp. cit. , p. 6.
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for the organization.
Role hierarchies and power hierarchies should not be
considered as two separate structures within the organiza- 
12tion. Authority is a source or element of power insofar 
as the role is perceived as capable of reinforcing value 
systems. Power may exist in the absence of authority if the 
personal qualities of the individual are the sole source of 
value satisfaction. Only when the power-holder (sans 
authority) has strong identity with the organization can the 
writer conceive of subordinates to that power-holder choosing 
to participate in organized activity. Observation would seem 
to indicate that ability to reinforce values is a function 
of both position and personal attributes. If this observa­
tion is valid then it would seem advantageous to view 
organization as a structure based on power.
Proper perspective for the power hierarchy can best be 
attained by using the role hierarchy as a base and by think­
ing of power as a being "concentrated at those points where 
the dominant values of a group or society are reflected in 
the most representative fashion. These are points where 
decisions are made which are accepted by those who will be
A typical classification of structures separates the 
organization into its "formal" and "informal" components.
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1 ^affected by their consequences." Further, if the portion 
of power deriving from authority is taken as given by virtue 
of position, the critical variable in the power hierarchy may 
be investigated.
In the static analysis of the organization in equilib­
rium, authority and power must by definition be coterminous. 
However, if the organization is viewed as being in a steady 
state requiring continual input and output, it is charac­
terized by change rather than statioriarity. Power is ac­
corded to those who have the perceived capacity to reinforce 
given value systems under a variety of circumstances or a 
variety of value systems under given circumstances. Since 
personal flexibility is likely to exceed position flexibility, 
the power structure will probably diverge from the authority 
structure. In diverging, the power structure will not merely 
parallel the authority structure but may result in shifts in 
hierarchical levels.' Changes which result in relatively 
stable misalignment of the hierarchies will result in the 
shifting of the formal hierarchy toward the informal or power 
hierarchy. In the perspective of the natural-system theory,
■^Herbert J. Spiro, "Authority, Values, and Policy," 
in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Authority (Cambridge, Massachu­
setts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 50.
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the power hierarchy is homeostatically and spontaneously 
evolved, around the efficiency oriented role hierarchy of 
the rational theory.
The organization as a power structure is a somewhat 
ambiguous concept. Power is continually changing shape and 
form while structure is symbolic of rigidity or resistance 
to change. Power, other than that part founded on authority, 
may be intransitive, whereas structure connotes a transitive 
relationship between hierarchial levels. Power is a product 
of the social relation but structure in part determines that 
relation. In spite of this seeming incompatibility, power, 
to be meaningful must be thought of as having structure.
This structure is found in the integration of the value 
systems of the organization and its participating members. 
The structure will vary with the degree of integration, and 
integration will vary with the reciprocal capacities for 
value reinforcement.
VARIATIONS IN TYPES OF POWER STRUCTURES
One of many ways in which power structures may be 
classified is according to the relative deviation from the 
authority structure. In choosing this method of classifica­
tion, the writer is not attempting to portray pure types but
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suggests that these types are suggestive of directional 
orientation. It hears repeating that authority is power 
which has been legitimated by the members of the organization 
through acceptance of role prescriptions. Authority is not, 
from this viewpoint, vested in the person at the apex of the 
hierarchy and delegated down through the subordinate 
levels.^
The three somewhat arbitrary categories of power struc­
tures selected for discussion are authoritarian, permissive, 
and collaborative. Blake and Mouton have devised a power 
spectrum which can be adapted to these structural categories.1  ^
A portion of the Blake and Mouton power spectrum is repro­
duced below:
i/i ;'i/o... .5/.5... 0/1 1 0/0
Competition;
1
Collaboration !Powerlessness 
1
FIGURE 1— THE POWER SPECTRUM
1<^ If authority were regarded as apex-to-hase delega­
tion, all structure could be analyzed solely on the basis of 
authority with no consideration of power. Power acts would 
be regarded as violations of authority or, at the discretion 
of the one who delegates, as part of the role prescription.
^Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, Group Dynamics—  
Key to Decision Making (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing
Company, 1961), p. 29.
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The spectrum starts on the left with a 1/0 relationship 
indicating complete power in the superior, and ends with an 
0/1 relationship on the right indicating power in the sub­
ordinate. The range between the extremes, centering at 
.5/.5, are indicative of various levels of collaboration.
To the extreme left is a 1/1 relationship which indicates 
competition or "equal" power and at the extreme right is a 
0/0 condition which is a state of powerlessness. (Under the 
definition of power proposed here, both 1/1 and 0/0 con­
ditions would be powerlessness in a given social relation,) 
The discussion of these types of structures will be descrip­
tive but will also indicate the basic orientation of each in 
terms of the Blake and Mouton spectrum and how it is derived.
Authoritative Structure
The authoritative power structure is characterized by 
a distribution of power which coincides with the distribution 
of authority. In the pure type of authority structure, the 
entire decisional autonomy of the members is surrendered to 
the organization and re-vested in them through role pre­
scription. Power acts are circumscribed by the lattitude 
assigned to the position. The amount of lattitude does not 
determine the type of structure but rather is itself deter­
mined by it since lattitude may be legitimized by the
i
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organization. Either highly centralized or de-centralized 
organizations may be held to be authority structures.
In terms of the Blake and Mouton spectrum, the author­
itative structure has the nature of a 1/0 relationship. The 
members of the organization accept an authority-obedience 
relationship in which they perceive that personal goals can 
best be obtained indirectly by working toward organization 
goals. The value systems of the organization and of the 
members are integrated to the extent that both are attained 
by working toward the one. Typically, the values of the 
organization (say profits in an economic organization) serve 
as a common denominator for all the individual values. By 
deciding to participate the individual contracts to exhibit 
a certain behavior in return for a specific share in the 
goals of the organization. If the authority is complete, in 
a 1/0 sense, then the member actually must accept whatever 
share is offered, and deliver whatever behavior pattern is 
requested, or exercise his prerogative to resign. If no other 
affiliation is open to the participant his decision to par­
ticipate will be based on the relative weight he places on 
values in his value system; that is, gainful employment and 
avoiding exploitation.
A power structure, with authority orientation, is
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predominantly a superior-subordinate relationship. >t will 
be maintained as long as the opportunity costs to its mem­
bers, measured in terms of sacrifice of value system rein­
forcement, is less than it would be in available alternatives. 
Power is limited by role prescription and the ability to 
evoke creative and innovative behavior is curtailed. The 
organization is likely to react sluggishly to change unless 
the authority is concentrated in relatively few positions 
with wide lattitudes of prescribed behavior.
Permissive Structure
At the opposite end of the Blake and Mouton spectrum 
from 1/0 authority structure is 0/1 permissive structure.
In permissive structure, the superior retains authority, and 
hence power, but the power of personal attributes resides 
entirely in the subordinate. By being permitted to act over 
a wide behavior set the subordinate is capable of altering 
the probability of attainment of individual and group objec­
tives. The authority of the superior is confined primarily 
to the maintenance of substantive institutions in the form of 
organization values and the selection of participants. How­
ever, permissiveness pervades the structure and power accrues 
to the individual at all levels in the hierarchy as they
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demonstrate personal capability for individual value rein­
forcement.
In contrast to the authoritative structure, permis­
sive structure features actions directed toward individual 
goals. The value system of the group is reinforced by the 
residue resulting from the combination. Coordination of 
individual effort and continuation of the organization 
depends on the identification of the members with the values 
of the organization. Through substantive identification the 
collective and individual goals are integrated, but the pro­
cedures for attaining those goals are minimally institution­
alized.
The structure of power in the permissive organization 
is marked by a high degree of intransitivity unless the
ft
individual value systems are similarly constituted. Intran­
sitivity results in more than one superior having power over 
a single subordinate in contrast to the "chain of command" of 
the authoritative structure. Rooted in intransitivity is the 
tendency for power structure to develop into a larger and 
more complex system of power. As Lasswell and Kaplan stated, 
"Systems of domination which remained independent of one 
another and, at the same time, claimed obedience within the 
same social field, from the same individuals, would encounter
conflicts. Conflicts among power structures result either
in the destruction of all conflicting units or in a combina-
1tion of them into hierarchies.1,10 The permissive structure 
may thus be thought of as a power hierarchy based largely on 
personal domination.
Collaborative Structure
Between the extremes of authoritative and permissive 
structure, there exists a range of structures which this 
writer has chosen to designate as collaborative. Actually, 
following the Blake and Mouton spectrum, all structure could 
be classified by the degree of collaboration. But both 
extremes are non-collaborative and must be identified as to 
directional deviation. It would appear, then, that a mean­
ingful classification would be collaborative with specified 
direction. In terms of the spectrum collaborative structure 
centers at .5/.5 and ranges toward 1/0 or 0/1.
The basic requirement of collaborative structure is 
the integration of value systems of the organization and its 
participants. The tendency toward either extreme in struc­
ture and the location within the spectrum depends on the 
relative weights placed on group and individual goals and the
1^Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 205.
institutionalization of substantive and procedural considera­
tions. The .5/.5 position in the spectrum indicates that 
power is derived from authority and personal attributes in 
equal proportions and that value systems are fully integrated 
though not identical. Power is not coterminous with author­
ity, but all power is directed toward specified objectives 
of the formal organization, the attainment of which is per­
ceived as the best available means of common fulfillment of 
relevant goals.
It would be unrealistic to classify a particular 
organization as having a stated collaborative structure (or 
any other structure) extending through even a short period 
of time. Only eclectic observation, by pre-determined selec­
tion or accident, would support the contention that an organ­
ization has a definite and stationary structure. Power and 
its structure are functions of the value systems of members 
of the social relation termed organization. Even if constant 
value systems (and constant internal ordering of value sys­
tems) could be assumed, the degree of integration of those 
systems will vary among the different decision-areas of the 
organization at any given time, and the structure of the 
organization will vary accordingly. Further pressure toward
structure variability is inherent in the time-dimension of 
organization.
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The organization can only dispose of its output when 
that output reinforces the value system of some larger 
organization. In the absence of an universal value (even 
survival cannot qualify— "better dead than Red"), the organi­
zation must change its output, its values, and hence its 
structure as it exists through time. (The organization 
maintains a structure, it is true, but when a given structure 
becomes its ruling value, it assures its own demise.)
Organization is seen to be a collaborative power 
structure with internal and external forces contributing to 
structural flexibility. To continue its existence the organ­
ization must serve the value systems of its participants and 
the value system of the larger organization of which it is a 
part. Value systems are not served directly, but by accom­
plishing certain specified, intermediate ends. These ends, 
or goals, are specified by values and are attained through 
efforts coordinated by the power structure.
GOAL ATTAINMENT THROUGH POWER STRUCTURE
The goals of the organization are achieved through the
17mobilization of individual capabilities. These capabilities.
^Parsons, "Sociology of Organizations," II, p. 225.
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are potential behavior sets of the participating members.
The ability of the organization to marshal the behavior sets 
required for attainment of goals lies in the power structure 
of the organization and may be described as control. In the 
rational model control is the ability to manipulate the power 
structure according to some pre-determined criterion of effi­
ciency. Control in the natural-system model is the ability 
of the organization to maintain its steady state through 
homeostatic adaptation. The opportunity for meeting the 
rational and natural requirements for control is contained in 
the collaborative power structure described above. The role 
of the power structure as a control mechanism is explicated 
by the clarification of Melville Dalton's statement that
"Organizations are systems of formal roles that direct and
18shape role occupants." Dalton continues:
Roles never coincide perfectly with players. At 
times the system must alter roles and manipulate oc­
cupants to preserve itself. Personal sentiments 
encourage and maintain distortions. While appearing 
to respect the ethics of his group and of the organ­
ization, the occupant must be able to take multiple 
informal roles, and to deal with those of others while 
preserving the essentials of his charted role. Through 
personal endowment and aid from others, the strong 
occupant shapes his role as it guides him, as against 
the weak occupant who offers only minimum aid to his 
role.
l®Dalton, loc. cit.
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In variously compromising its ends, the organi­
zation forces role occupants to assert, but com­
promise, their innately human purposes.19
It would appear from Dalton's statement that conflict 
is endemic to the organization. Conflict between roles and 
players is essentially conflict between conformity and 
creativity. If organization goals are thought to be served 
best by rational conformity, then control is a damping 
mechanism devoted primarily to maintaining a condition of 
equilibrium through the resolution of role and player con­
flict. If, however, those goals can be served best by enlist-
20ing creativity and intelligence, control is transformed 
into a guiding mechanism giving direction to a dynamic steady 
state. Control, in either case, is a function of power. It 
is through the distribution of power among functionally inter­
dependent individuals or systems of individuals that goals 
are attained.
Distribution of Power to Attain Goals
Organizational structure is a series of power relations. 
Each power relation is an input-output system interacting with
19Ibid. , p. 259.
■ • V
20 . . . .Dwaine Marvick, "Expectations Concerning Power m  a
Bureaucratic Arena," Administrative Science Quarterly, II
(1958), 542.
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other power relations in order to attain goals. These goals 
are attained only when the system can offer output which will 
satisfy values of the larger system. The formal organization 
is distinguished from its larger system by specified goals.
It is dependent upon the output of its sub-systems to attain 
its goals and must enter an exchange relation with these sub­
systems to obtain input. The medium of exchange within the 
organization is power, and expenditure of this medium of ex­
change is in the form of re-distribution in the power struc­
ture.
In a strict sense, the organization distributes satis­
faction for the value system of the subordinate system. But 
since value is expressed as a desired relationship with the 
relevant surroundings and power is the ability to create this 
relationship, the organization may be said to distribute 
power.
To attain specific goals the organization must be able 
to expect the performance of specific sets of acts from each 
of its sub-systems. The organization expends some of its 
power in obtaining this disciplined performance or conformity. 
However, if the potential acts of the sub-system which can be 
useful to the organization exceed the minimum expected under 
conformity, the organization may be willing to distribute
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additional power-potential to obtain these acts. The extra 
expenditures of power are directed toward enlisting the intel­
ligent contributions or creativity of the individual.
Conformity. The individual brings with him into the
organization a set of behavior capabilities arising from his
21cognitive, motor, and emotional properties. The initial
criterion for affiliation with the organization is that this
behavior potential includes the capability for performing the
specific acts essential to organization purpose. Within this
22 .behavior potential is a "zone of acceptance" or specific 
behavior set which the individual is willing to perform in 
return for the value reinforcement perceived to be offered 
by the organization. The second criterion of participation 
is that this zone of acceptance include the required acts. 
Since the zone of acceptance will vary with the perceived 
inducement, the organization expends at least some part of 
its power to assure the inclusion of the essential acts. In
po ,
the "physiological organization theory" of the scientific
^iRosen, Levinger, and Lippitt, loc. cit.
22Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938),
p. 168.
23James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 13.
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management era, efficiency could be ascertained by the degree 
of conformity between the zone of acceptance and the organi­
zation requirements.
If the individual is capable of a wider range of acts 
than are necessary for the performance of his role, the 
organization must also expend potential in discouraging those 
acts which are dysfunctional. Disciplined conformity, or 
limited performance, is accomplished through the expenditure 
of power in the form of negative sanctions. Negative sanc­
tions, in turn, may lead to some loss in identification 
which is a further expenditure of power. Unless negative 
sanctions have positive value for the participants, the or­
ganization could bankrupt itself attempting to insure conform­
ity. The obvious solution to this dilemma is the selection 
of participants with capabilities which coincide with their 
zones of acceptance and that are limited to the requirements 
of the position. The distribution of power which results in 
maximum conformity may be proposed as a rational ideal for 
the organization in static equilibrium. If the expectations 
of organization include change, some redistribution of power 
must be made for continued attainment of organization goals.
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Creativity. Expenditures of power to obtain conform­
ity were shown to be made on the basis of certainty about 
the future. By assuming certainty the organization may direct 
its efforts and expenditures toward obtaining specific per­
formance. However, if expectations include the possibility 
of change in either performance or requirements, the organi­
zation risks the probability that efficiency will deteriorate. 
As compensation for this risk, the organization may distrib­
ute power to allow for ranges of performance and require­
ments. Or, power is spent to encourage intelligent contribu­
tion and creativity.
At the extreme, the organization may distribute power 
to compensate for uncertainty rather than risk. In this case, 
the expenditure on conformity would be eliminated and all 
performance would be creative. A finite set of capabilities 
would be induced, through distribution of power, to meet an 
infinite set of requirements.^4 All behavior would be 
creative, but the output of the creative sub-system may or 
may not be usable to the organization in attaining its goals.
24As a limit, the concept of uncertainty may be useful 
in analyzing organizations such as those engaged in pure or 
basic research. However, the formal organization is defined 
as having specific goals and thus at most a finite range of 
requirements to attain those goals.
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An organization of totally creative and non-conforming par­
ticipants would attain a specific goal more often by accident 
than by design. Because uncertainty is irreducible, however, 
does not mean that creativity is also without merit even in 
pursuit of specific goals.
If expectations about change can be stated in a way 
that some probability of specific goal attainment can be 
inferred from a finite set of requirements, then uncertainty 
can be converted to risk. And the expenditure of power on 
creativity is the allowance made for risk. By spending all 
its power on conformity, the organization may assure its im­
mediate, .specific goals but forfeit the chance to attain its 
values which are more obscure and remote. Expenditures on 
creativity could have just the opposite effect. The answer 
lies in a balance which is a calculated risk. The power 
which the organization must spend on each depends on the con­
stancy of the requirements for meeting organization goals and 
on the range of capabilities of individual participants. The 
total power which must be spent is determined by the nature 
of the dependency relationship between the organization and 
its members.
Functional Interdependence of Participants
An organization is a system of sub-systems each of
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which is a power relation. Just as the power of the sub­
system is a dependency relation, so is the power of the 
organization determined by the functional interdependence of 
its participants. The reinforcement that the individual 
receives from the organization depends on the essentiality 
of his output to the organization goals and on his dependency 
on the organization for attainment of personal goals. Robert 
Dubin puts it this way:
Power relations are the relations among organiza­
tion members that correlate their separate functions 
according to the necessity these functions have for 
the organization.
Power relations serve to tie organization members 
to each other by organizing systems of functional 
inter-dependence. . . .  Each has power but in dif­
ferent amounts, because each performs functions that 
have different degrees of necessity for the organiza­
tion. . . .
It should be noted that power relations do not 
depend on happy agreement among those interacting.
Every individual is a participant in a power relation­
ship whether he likes it or not so long as he is per­
forming a function that brings him into a direct 
relationship with someone e l s e . 2 5
The amount of power the organization is willing to 
give up in exchange for sub-system output varies directly 
with the essentiality of that output for organization goals.
25R0t»ert Dubin, The World of Work (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall^ Inc., 1958), p. 29.
a
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The amount of power the sub-system is willing to take, for a 
behavior-set creating that output varies inversely with the 
dependency of the sub-system on the organization for satis­
faction of personal goals.
When economic wealth is treated as the common denomi­
nator for the sources of power, it is not too difficult to 
determine the "price" the organization is willing to pay for 
essential output. Since essentiality precludes the availa­
bility of substitutes, the price could be stated as value of 
marginal product or marginal revenue product. Again using 
wealth as a measure of power, the dependency of the partici­
pant on the organization could be asserted as opportunity 
cost determined by availability of alternative uses. The 
difficulty of determining price is compounded, however, when 
the assumption of wealth as a measure of power is relaxed.
The organization can determine the value of contribu­
tions only in terms of its own value system which may well 
be different from the heterogeny of value systems of its 
members. Likewise, opportunity costs are net costs in terms 
of values which the individual holds. True, the organiza­
tion can buy conformity, or a specified area of behavior, by
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offering a package of values which the individual can weigh 
against alternative offers in order to decide. However, 
creativity is enlisted only when inducements are based on 
the value of potential contributions, rather than actual.
If both conformity and creativity are perceived as essential 
to organization purpose, the organization must be willing to 
accept distribution and re-distribution of its power. The 
amounts of power distributed and the directions in which it 
flows are determined by the functional interdependence of 
the participants.
Every organization has potential for power deriving 
from the surrender of decisional autonomy by the members.
The accumulated power is distributive and is the medium of 
exchange in the exchange relations with its sub-systems. A 
power structure develops in accordance with the relative 
importance of contributions„ In an equilibrium condition of 
the organization the power structure is relatively stable 
since contributions need only conform to existing require­
ments. As changes occur, the equilibrium is disturbed and 
the organization depends on creativity to meet changing needs. 
Creativity involves a re-distribution of power and hence a 
change in the power structure. Since various degrees of
conformity and creativity are required at various levels in 
the organizational hierarchy at various times, the power 
structure at any time will he composed of dissimilar elements. 
These elements are described as authoritative, permissive, 
or collaborative. The efficiency of the organization rests 
on its ability to utilize a flexible structure in a dynamic 
environment by spending power to reinforce the value systems 
of its members. Maintenance of the organization is a func­
tion of the decision-making process. How power enters this 
process is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
POWER IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION
The existence of any organization which has a purpose, 
other than mere social interaction of its members, is predi­
cated on the ability to make decisions. The formal organiza­
tion, defined as having specific goals or objectives, is both 
the product and the producer of decision. It is the product 
of the decisions of its members to combine efforts for the 
enhancement of individual values and the producer of deci­
sions about specific goals and methods of attaining them. It 
might be added that the organization is ever dependent on the 
decisions of its members to participate. As the values of 
members change, or as changes occur in members' perception 
of the organization’s ability to satisfy values, the organi­
zation must either change its goals to meet the changed need, 
or attract new members by maintaining the established goals.
The dynamics of organization as an input-output system re­
sides in the continual process of decision.
In the usual terminology, choice from among alternatives
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seems to be the end-point of decision.'*" Decision is seen to 
include all those activities which precede choice but not of 
those activities which follow. The point of view adopted 
here is that choice is the mid-point rather than the end­
point of decision. The decision process is "an effective
determination of policy. It involves the total process of
2bringing about a specified course of action." Decision, as 
effective determination of policy, is measured in terms of 
results rather than desires. Standing between choice, as 
desire, and decision, as result, is the intervening variable 
of power.
Toward understanding the role of power in the organi­
zational decision, the following pages will be devoted to a 
somewhat extended examination of decision-making as a con­
tinuous, effective process, and to the application to that 
process of the concepts of power developed earlier. Although 
an analysis of the decision process is parenthetical to the 
primary purpose of this paper, it is necessary to dwell on
^•James D. Thompson and Arthur Tuden, "Strategies, 
Structures, and Processes of Organizational Decision," in 
James D. Thompson, et al., eds., Comparative Studies in 
Administration (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1959), p. 196.
^Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 74.
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the relationships among the decision premises and elements 
in order to comprehend the significance of power in the 
organization.
PURVIEW OF THE DECISION PROCESS
Decision is necessitated by some deviation or antici­
pated deviation from a desired relationship between the 
decision-maker and his environment. In equilibrium analysis,
the purpose of decision is to establish a relationship which
3makes further decision unnecessary. However, m  a society 
characterized by change, or disequilibrium, there appears to 
be no end to the need for decision. Decision, as process, 
cannot be suspended in time to provide final answers. Rather, 
decision is always "forward looking, formulating alternative 
courses of action extending into the future, and selecting 
among the alternatives by expectations of how things will 
turn out."^ If decision is taken to be effective choice, and 
some choice is directed toward distant values, then the time 
span of decision may extend indefinitely into the future.
In surveying the decision process, it is impractical
^Paul Diesing, "Noneconomic Decision-Making," Ethics, 
LXVI (1955), 33.
^Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. xv-xvi.
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to include a significant portion of the contributions of 
statistical and economic decision theorists. It is felt that 
the major concern should be to analyze some of the major pre­
mises of decision in terms of their importance for organiza­
tional behavior. It should be remembered that an organization 
is said to be a system composed of sub-systems, with each 
sub-system having an outlet for its output in the larger 
system. The sub-system may be composed of one or any number 
of individuals. Further, each sub-system has goals which are 
attained through exchange with the super-system. Decisions 
are made concerning output and the organization of resources 
toward producing that output, and the decision unit may be 
one person or many.
The situation of decision will be examined with refer­
ence to the basic elements of the process, followed by a 
view of the relationship of these elements in their dynamic 
setting. Then attention will be turned to the rationality 
of decision and some of its ramifications. Next the meaning 
of effective decision in social context will be developed.
The view of decision will be concluded with an examination 
of the concept of participation in decision.
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Elements of Decision and Their Relationships
Several writers, including C. West Churchman, have 
recognized three classes of elements entailed in decision: 
the decision—maker, a set of alternative actions, and a set
C
of goals. To these three James Bates, in "Model for the 
Science of Decision," adds environment, as does Herbert 
Simon in his article, "Decision-making in Economics."' 
Churchman defines the binary relations among these elements, 
excluding the environment, as the probability of choosing a 
certain action, the probability of occurrence of a given 
goal if one of the actions is chosen, and the value of the
Q
goals to the decision-maker. These proposed binary rela­
tions are the basis for the discussion below.
Decision-maker and Environment. The decision-maker, 
whether one or many, seeks goals in the form of a changed 
relationship with his environment. His decisions about goals
5C . West Churchman, Prediction and Optimal Decision 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
pp. 137-38.
6James Bates, "A Model for the Science of Decision," 
Philosophy of Science, XXI (1954), 335.
7Herbert A. Simon, "Theories of Decision-Making in 
Economics and Behavioral Science," American Economic Review, 
XLIX (1959), 272.
^Churchman, ojo. cit. , p. 138.
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are influenced by his information about his environment.
But, as Simon says:
The decision-makers' information about his 
environment is much less than an approximation 
to the real environment. . . . The perceived 
world is fantastically different from the real 
world. The differences involve both omissions 
and distortions. . . . The decision-makers model 
of the world encompasses only a minute fraction 
of all the information that is present even in 
his model.^ ■
Although the whole of reality may be said to comprise 
the environment, there are some limits which can be drawn in 
defining the relevant environment of the decision-maker. The 
decision-maker is concerned with specific goals and actions 
and his environment may be described as the situation which 
limits the goals and actions that are available. For a 
decision condition there must be at least one goal and two 
actions in the environment of the decision-maker.^®
In the individual decision the environment begins at 
the periphery of the personality and extends far enough to 
encompass the specific goal or goals of the individual. The 
environment is not constant except with reference to a par­
ticular goal of the decision-maker. The limits of the
9Simon, "Decision-Making in Economics," p. 272. 
l®James Bates, loc. cit.
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environment may be thought to be drawn by the levels of 
aspiration of the individual and to change with changing 
aspirations. The environment is external to the individual 
and his decisions are the basis for psychomotor activities 
directed toward changing some relationship with the external 
state. The individual decision is a molar concept in that 
the action produced by the individual may be viewed as a whole 
behavior pattern without regard for the internal development 
of that behavior.
The organization, as a system of systems, has both 
internal and external components in its environment. The 
external limits of decision environment, as in individual 
decision, are determined by the specific goals with which the 
decision is concerned. The internal limits extend throughout 
all the sub-systems whose behavior patterns modify the 
effectiveness of decision. The organization decision is thus 
seen to be a molecular concept, composed of actions which are 
the product of behavior patterns of the sub-systems. Informa­
tion about the organizational environment is perceptual and 
inferential with reference to both values and facts that are 
relevant for the decision-maker.
Decision-maker and Action. Alternatives are lines of 
action which are open to the decision-maker. According to
rational decision theory, actions are ranked by the criterion 
of efficiency, where efficiency includes both cost and the 
probability of goal attainment. The rational decision-maker 
is always neutral as to actions but biased as to goals even 
if those goals have been selected in a rational manner. How­
ever, if two or more actions are perceived as having the same 
efficiency for attaining a specific goal, the decision-maker 
may evidence preference for one over the others because of 
the desirability of the action itself. The relationship 
between the decision-maker and action may be expressed as the 
probability that the decision-maker will choose a particular 
action.^ Rational theory would seem to imply that the 
probability of choosing the most efficient action would 
always be one and the probability of choosing any other 
action would be zero. The implication here is that the 
decision-maker is not neutral between means and the probab­
ility of goal attainment is the product of the probability 
that a particular action will be chosen and the probability 
that a particular action will result in the specified goal.
In the effective organization decision, the molar 
action of the group is made up of a series of molecular
^Churchman, loc. eit.
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actions of individuals. Each actor in the decision process 
has at least two alternative lines of action from which to 
choose. If actors have some preference as to acts, the 
probability of the molar action occurring is the compound 
probability of occurrence of all its molecular parts. Apply­
ing the criterion of efficiency to the molar action, the 
organizational choice will be based on the probability that 
that action will occur and on the probability that it has for 
attainment of the designated goal.
Decision-maker and Goals. The relationship of the
decision-maker to goals is expressed in terms of the value
12of the goals for the decision-maker. This statement would 
seem to indicate that the decision-maker could assign a 
weight to various relationships with his environment and rank 
these goals in terms of value satisfaction. Choice of goals 
would then be based on the ordered system of goals. The 
decision-maker would start with stated goals and broaden the 
environment to include the actions necessary for the attain­
ment of those goals. Implied is a system of values independ­
ent of the "state of the arts" by which the values are to be 
satisfied. By expanding the environment, the decision-maker
12Ibid.. p. 138.
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can change the state of the arts to include actions required 
for goal attainment. If the decision-maker, as a goal-seeker, 
takes the available actions as given, his goals must be set 
within the area of perceived fulfillment.
The level to which the decision-maker aspires may be 
said to be both a determinant of alternative courses of 
action and determined by availability of these courses. The 
adjustment of goals to capabilities is explained by Simon, 
who says, "There is a great deal of psychological evidence 
that the aspirations that influence choice are highly sensi­
tive to success and failure— that persistent failure to 
attain an aspired level reduces the aspiration; while success
■J O
raises it. The decision-maker chooses goals which he has
reasonable expectation of achieving.
Actions and Goals. The relationship between actions
and goals is expressed in terms of the probability that if
14one of the actions takes place, a given goal will occur.
The probability of goal attainment attached to a given action
^Herbert a . Simon, "The Role of Expectations in an 
Adaptive or Behavioristic Model," in Mary Jean Bowman, ed., 
Expectations, Uncertainty, and Business Behavior (New York: 
Social Science Research Council, 1958), p. 55.
Churchman, loc. cit.
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is a measure of effectiveness by which a method of decision
15may be evaluated. In the individual, rational decision,
the primary concern is with which action will maximize the 
chances of attaining a specified goal. Over some period of 
time, the available actions will influence the selection of 
goals and the probabilities of choice of both goals and 
actions are conditional probabilities. Goals are selected 
which are perceived as attainable through available actions. 
The action is chosen on the basis of effectiveness in attain­
ing goals, conditioned by the desirability of the action it­
self.
In the molar concept of organization decision, empha­
sis is again placed on the effectiveness of specific actions 
in attaining given goals. Molar action, however, is depend­
ent on molecular actions which are selected on the basis of 
effectiveness in attaining goals which differ from those on 
which molar action is based. From the organization point of 
view, effective decision is contingent on the probability 
that a molar action will result in the desired outcome, and 
on the probability that molecular courses of action will 
culminate in the selected molar action. The organization is
15Bates, pp. cit., p. 338.
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first concerned that the molar action is within its potential 
and, second, with the likelihood that the necessary molecular 
acts will be induced.
Dynamics of Decision
A dynamic analysis involves a study of the transition 
from past to present, or present to future. The decision 
process is the vehicle by which this transition is accom­
plished. The purpose of decision is to inaugurate changes in 
relationships with the environment of the decision-maker. The 
decision may be directed toward changing either the internal 
or external state of the decision-maker, or it may be directed 
toward holding either state constant in the face of change 
in the other. Whether decision is compensatory or innova­
tive, it results from perceived change or the perceived 
desirability of change.
Decision, as a continuous process, has no determinable 
beginning or end and cannot be separated from the context in 
which it develops. In the words of Melville Dalton:
We cannot say how much of what develops after a 
decision is the result of the decision maker's in­
sights, and how much arises from unassessed factors 
in the ongoing complex. Some executives see the 
situation as so ambiguous that most people don't 
live long enough to get blame or credit for their 
decisions, and that one’s decisions may never be 
proved wrong. Drucker expects a steady increase
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in the time-span for testing a decision, and even 
stronger, Urwick feels that an indefinite future 
is required to tell the effects of a decision.
Despite the difficulty involved, some efforts must be 
devoted to investigating this continuous process known as 
decision. Since decision is directly concerned with change, 
it is thought that the recognition of change is an acceptable 
starting point for the investigation. The recognition of 
change is empty unless some action program is instituted. 
Consequently, the study will continue with the development 
of alternatives and the evolution of action around these 
choices. Finally, attention will be turned to evaluation 
and adjustment, which is actually the basis for the recog­
nition of change because the decision cannot be evaluated 
except as to the change which it has wrought.
Recognition of Change. It has been postulated that the 
decision-maker in the formal organization is favored with 
specific goals by which to evaluate his decisions. An added 
postulate was that goals are in the form of a desired rela­
tionship with the decision-maker's environment. Decisions, as 
final answers, are predicated on the constancy of the environ­
ment and the continuing facility of selected actions for
16Dalton, o£. cit., p. 190.
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maintaining the desired relationship. Changes in either the 
environment or the facility of action necessitate decision. 
Decision may be directed toward redefining the relationship 
with the environment or toward altering the activities of the 
organization. In either case the decision-maker recognizes 
some deviation from the desired relationship and is motivated 
to act toward reconciliation of goals and actions.
The change on which decision is predicated is at best 
a relative measure. Goals are expressed as relative to the 
environment while actions are evaluated relative to goals.
In order for changes to be observed, there must be some 
change in relationship of the organization with its external 
environment and its internal actions. Decision is directed 
toward establishing and maintaining a desired relationship 
among the dynamic variables of goals, actions, and environ­
ment. The need for decision comes from recognition of some 
change in the desired relationship.
Development of Alternatives. Changes in the organiza- 
tion-environment relationship indicate a need for change in 
the action-program of the organization. The organization 
may respond to change by denying the existence of change 
through perceptual distortion, or it may compensate for 
change through a variety of decision processes. Simon has
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classified the types of decision into "programmed" and "non-
17programmed" decision. In keeping with the concept of ef­
fective decision, the programming idea can be applied better 
to the development of alternatives than to decision.
In an individual sense man can merely choose among 
ready-made alternatives, according to Bertrand Russell.-*-®
If one of these alternatives is to expand his environment 
to include other ready-made alternatives, there is no cause 
for argument with Russell's statement. The programmed 
decision of Simon may be described as search within a given 
environment. The decision-maker, perceiving change, searches 
his "memory" for a previous, similar situation and applies 
the program which was used for the solution of the earlier 
problem.
If the new situation does not appear to correspond to 
some previously experienced situation, the decision-maker 
develops a new program to meet the new need. Actually, no 
experience is likely to be perceived as entirely new since 
perception has its roots in the state of the individual at 
the time of the experience. A new program is, therefore,
-*-7Simon, "Role of Expectations," p. 49. 
l®Russell, pp. cit., p. 160.
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most lively to be an adaptation or revision of a former pro­
gram, which may be recognized as part of the learning process. 
The development of new programs, or modification of old ones, 
is the equivalent of extension of the decision-maker's environ­
ment to include new alternatives.
In addition to formulating alternatives, the decision­
maker must choose from among his formulations. The criterion 
of efficiency would require that all possible alternatives be 
developed and that selection be based on effectiveness for 
attaining goals. Since it is reasonable to assume that the 
number of possible actions is practically without limit, the 
rational decision-maker's task would seem impossible. But 
decisions are made, apparently without feasibility studies 
of all possible courses of action.
An answer to the decision-maker's predicament may be 
found in Simon's satisficing, rather than optimizing, man.19 
The decision-maker selects the apparent best from among known 
alternatives and weighs it against his level of aspiration.
If the results he expects from choosing this course of action 
equals or surpasses his level of aspirations, he will pre­
sumably choose this alternative. If no known alternative
19Simon, "Role of Expectations," p. 56.
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meets the aspiration criterion, the decision-maker develops
new alternatives, one at a time, until he finds a line of
action which appears to meet his criterion. And it might be
added that if no alternative course of action offers a
minimally acceptable result, the attention is shifted to
alternative goals or lowered levels of aspiration. The
development of alternatives can conceivably involve the
20mutual modification of both goals and actions/
Evolution of Action. Actions are changes which occur 
as accommodation for changes in relationships. Those actions 
are termed desirable which are thought to result in restor­
ing the desired relationship. The development and selection 
of alternatives is concerned with the determination of 
desirable courses of action. Choice of a course of action is 
not the termination of the decision process. Decision is 
never terminated but is a continuous adjustment process in 
which actions are adapted to changing conditions to effect a 
desired outcome.
In the process of adjustment to change, desirable 
actions, those that have facility for goal attainment, are 
transformed into desired actions. Desires are communicated
^^Diesing, op. cit., p. 19.
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to all the molecular components of the total action, and the 
molecular participants reappraise the requested action on 
the basis of desirability, or facility for attaining sub­
ordinate goals. The resultant action at distant points in 
the decision process may consequently diverge extensively 
from the desired action at the molar level. Information 
about divergence may be fed back to the molar level and, in 
some circumstances, result in selection of new alternative 
courses of action without waiting for evaluation in terms of 
molar goal achievement. In the absence of absolute command 
performance of a specific behavior pattern and total acquies­
cence to that command, some deviation from desired perform­
ance is certain to occur. If the deviations do not vitiate 
organization purpose, the unintended actions are accepted by 
the organization and the action phase of decision may be re­
garded as an evolutionary process.
Evaluation and Adjustment. In dynamic analysis, it is 
impossible to make ex post facto evaluations of decision. 
However, periodic observations of performance can be compared 
with anticipated results. From this comparison, which is a 
measure of change, the decision-maker can determine the de­
sirability for developing new alternatives, establishing new 
goals, or taking steps toward more rigid enforcement of
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desired action. The decision-maker is on a treadmill as far 
as final answers are concerned. Decisions are made by all 
those who participate in the choice-action-outcome process. 
Each participant brings fact and value into the decision, 
with these facts and values evolving through experiental, 
perceptual, and inferential process. The organization deci­
sion is thus a matter of sequential evaluation of results and 
mutual adjustment of actions and goals in order to accom­
modate for perceived changes in a coveted relationship.
Participation in Decision
Decision has been described as effective determination 
of policy involving the total process of bringing about 
specific courses of action directed toward the fulfillment
p  *1
of pre-determined desires. ^ "In decision making only those
participate whose acts do in fact matter. . . .  And since the
decision-making process includes application as well as
formulation and promulgation of policy, those whose acts are
22affected also participate m  decision making." Between 
choice of action and realization of goals lies the body of 
potential on which effectiveness of decision must depend.
2lLasswell and Kaplan, pp. pit., p. 74. 
22Ibid., p. 74.
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In the organization, the body of potential is composed of 
systems of decision-makers, each of which has a range of 
potential actions. Organizational purpose is served only to 
the extent that sub-systems choose to contribute these 
potential actions; that is, to participate in the decision 
of the super-system.
Participation in decision is based on the accepta­
bility of the changes which are anticipated as a result of 
the decision. That is, the participant commits himself to 
the chosen line of action as he perceives that this line of 
action will reinforce his values, whatever they may be. If 
individual values are inseparable from organization values, 
participation will depend entirely on the perceived ration­
ality of the action for system goals. If values are wholly 
or partially determined outside the organization, on the 
other hand, participation will be bounded by the individual's 
commitment to a larger social role.^ The subsequent dis­
cussion will concern itself with both the rational and social 
elements of participation and with the implicit idea that 
participation may occur in less than total proportions.
23simon, "Role of Expectations," p. 54.
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Participation in Rational Decision. Rational decision, 
in its ideal form, is based on a closed system of neutral 
variables. As a closed system, any influence from outside 
the system would be felt only to the extent that it affected 
participation as an all-or-nothing concept. The "all" of 
participation does not imply a total contribution of all the 
capabilities of the participant. Rather, participation refers 
to the willingness of the system member to contribute a speci­
fied behavior pattern in return for agreed upon value satis­
faction .
A further aspect of the closed system is that once a 
member chooses to contribute the specified behavior pattern, 
his influence on the decision process is neutralized and may 
be taken as a constant value. Since the member may either 
participate or not participate, the value of the constant 
will always be either one or zero. Effectively, the decision­
making process is reduced to points of decision, and partici­
pation in decision is merely the decision to participate.
In less extreme form rational decision may be thought 
of as occurring within a hierarchy of systems and sub-systems. 
The super-system makes molar choices which are rational with 
reference to super-goals. Each sub-system endorses the molar 
choice insofar as it is rational for the sub-goal. But if
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conformity with the molar choice is a condition of continued
affiliation, the sub-system is reduced to a neutral variable
and decision-theory is a theory of choice.
Frequently mentioned as the ideal type of organization
for rational efficiency is Max Weber1s system of bureaucratic 
24specialists. The bureau is a sub-system responsible for 
decisions in a particular area of activity. Bureaus, how­
ever, are composed of sub-bureaus, just as systems are com­
posed of sub-systems and the same conditions for participa­
tion may be observed. In moving down the hierarchical levels, 
decisions are made more on factual rather than on value bases. 
But the decisions to make those decisions depend on the values 
of the individuals or sub-systems responsible for them.
Insofar as the individual identifies with the values of the 
system, the participation of the individual will be based on 
the perceived rationality of the decision for the system. In 
rational theory of organization, identification is regarded 
as sufficient as long as the participant is willing to con­
tribute the set of actions requested of him by the organiza­
tion. The boundaries of participation are established by the 
prescription of the organization role.
^Weber, pp. pit. , p. 436.
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Social Boundaries of Participation. Every organiza­
tion is composed of a system of roles with some degree of 
prescription as to the performance which is expected of the 
role occupant. In addition to organizational roles, every 
individual occupies other roles in his segment of society.
It would seem reasonable to assume that the various roles 
which the individual plays are adapted on the basis of mutual 
value satisfaction to the individual and those with whom he 
interacts. If the values of the separate roles are identi­
cal, the individual's value satisfaction is limited only by 
his personal capabilities. If, however, the values of the 
multiple groups with whom the individual identifies are 
divergent, or the actions which are required in one role are 
in conflict with the values of another role, the individual 
is subjected to pressure to choose between them. Participa­
tion in a given role is bounded by the prescriptions of all 
the roles which the individual occupies. The willingness to 
contribute certain behavior patterns is dependent on the 
absence of value conflicts. Stated somewhat differently, if 
the performance of specific acts is perceived as resulting in 
sacrifice of certain values, the reinforcement to other 
values must be increased.
The organization is composed of roles or decision
centers each of which participates in the decisions of a 
larger center of decision. Participation at the lowest de­
cision levels is presumably carried out on a factual basis 
with reference to organization values. However, the decision 
centers are composed of individuals each of whom has values 
based on his multiple roles. One of these roles derives from 
the decision center itself which has values that are the 
foundation of the so-called "informal" organization within 
the "formal" organization. Participation may be based on 
factual premises with respect to the formal organization, and 
on value premises with respect to the informal organization. 
The net effect of participation depends on the conflict among 
the facts of the system and the values of the sub-system.
The weight placed on each, fact and value, is a function of 
the intensity with which the individual identifies with the 
conflicting roles.
A further consideration of participation is the expec­
tations that the role-player holds for the participation of 
other role-players.^ That is, the individual as an amalgama­
tion of roles, forms a mean-image of other amalgamated roles 
and participates in a manner which, coupled with the expected
^Simon, "Role of Expectations," p. 54.
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behavior of the mean-image, he can reasonably expect to re­
sult in value reinforcement. If the resultant behavior is
within the prescribed limits of the formal role, participation 
will be directed toward organizational purpose. If, however,
the behavior is aberrant with reference to the role prescrip­
tion, it might be concluded by displacement from the formal 
role and consequently dissociation from the informal role. 
Thus, it may be seen that the social roles, formal and in­
formal, internal and external, form the basis for participa­
tion in decision.
Variability of Participation. All of the resources, 
material as well as human, available to the organization 
"participate" in the decision process in the sense that 
participation is used in this paper. Material resources may 
possess a range of characteristics, some of which are usable 
by the organization in seeking its goals. The specific 
property of the resource which the organization desires may 
also vary over a limited range. If this range is stable 
through time the resource may be considered to be homogeneous 
or coming from a homogeneous "universe." If the homogeneous 
universe lies entirely within the specifications for the de­
sired property, or if the probability that a unit of the 
resource drawn from the population will meet specifications
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is high enough, the organization will accept the resource for 
participation.
An analogy can be drawn from the behavior character­
istics of the human resources of the organization. Both 
human and material resources possess an infinite number of 
characteristics, a limited few of which are, or may be, usable 
at a given time by the organization. The same test for homo- 
geniety can be made to ascertain the presence of the desired 
properties with both types of resources. The "willingness" 
of both types to participate might even be considered a 
function of the "price" or inducement offered by the user.
The analogy ends, however, with the introduction of expecta­
tions, a characteristic peculiar to the human resource.
Material resource participation may be measured as an 
attribute, or an all or nothing quality, in a statistical 
sense, since the material is a neutral resource without ex­
pectations. The characteristics, which the homogeneous human 
resource is willing to exhibit, on the other hand, are a 
joint function of the expectations of the individual and the 
organization. Since the number and type of characteristics 
which the individual contributes may vary, human resource 
participation is observed to be a variable quality rather 
than an attribute.
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The polemic of rational and social theorists revolves 
around the choice of the unit by which the human resource 
may be measured. Although human resources are packaged in 
individual human bundles, the rational theorist chooses as 
his unit the particular behavior pattern which is relevant 
for specific decision. The social theorist selects the total 
behavior set of the individual as it is determined by the 
social role. Neither may be judged as "correct" or "incor­
rect" in isolation from the context in which decisions are 
made. It should be recognized that human participation may 
vary according to the perceived value satisfaction which 
accompanies that participation, and that the values are de­
termined, at least in part, by roles outside the prescribed 
station in the formal organization.
The need to view human participation in a broader 
perspective than hedonistic motivation based on some one
universal value prompted W. C. Mitchell, in 1914, to say:
It is because they are developing a sounder type 
of functional psychology that we may hope both to 
profit by and to share in the work of contemporary 
psychologists. But in embracing this opportunity 
economics will assume a new character. It will cease 
to be a system of pecuniary logic, a mechanical study 
of static equilibria under non-existent conditions, 
and become a science of human b e h a v i o r . 26
2^W. C. Mitchell, "Human Behavior and Economics," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXIX (1914), 47.
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Regardless of whether the "sounder type of functional 
psychology" has failed to materialize or whether "economics" 
has failed "to embrace the opportunity," the need to inte­
grate the contributions of the behavior disciplines appears 
as great in 1963 as it did in 1914. A key variable that 
transcends the value sciences is power. And the proper 
setting for the examination of the dynamics of power is in 
the decision process which has a future state of affairs as 
its sole concern.
POWER IN THE DECISION PROCESS
The decision process is aimed at procuring a desired 
state of affairs in the nature of a changed relationship at 
some time after the present. The changed relationship is 
brought about through the coordination of the behavior 
characteristics of resources available to the decision­
making organism. Coordination implies the ability to influ­
ence the resources to behave in such a way as to bring about 
the desired change. The ability to evoke actions has pre­
viously been described as the phenomenon of power. If 
decision is thought to be a process composed of choice, 
action, and outcome, and power is the ability to influence 
action, then power is actually control of the decision process.
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How power affects the decision process will be discussed 
within the framework of decision outlined above, and with 
reference to the nature and structure of power as developed 
in Chapters I and XI.
Power and the Decision Elements
The elements of decision were enumerated above as the 
decision-maker, his environment, alternative actions, and 
a set of goals. Power, as a social relation, exists only as 
a property of the interaction between two or more of the 
decision elements. Since decision is taken here to mean 
effective decision, the decision-maker is always a part of 
the relations between the other elements of decision.
The interaction of the decision-maker with his environ­
ment contains all the essential elements of a power relation. 
The environment must depend to some degree on the output of 
the decision-maker or the decision-maker would be unable to 
exchange his output for value reinforcement and would cease 
to exist. Conversely, the decision-maker is dependent on the 
exchange relation with his environment for value satisfaction. 
The direction and amount of power is a function of the rela­
tive importance of this mutual dependency.
If the decision-maker is the sole possessor of 
resources valued by the environment, and which have no
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substitutes, then he has absolute power over that environ­
ment with reference to the decision-maker's specific objec­
tive or goal. As a pure monopolist or tyrant, the decision­
maker can command his "price", in the exchange relation. At 
the other extreme of the spectrum in which the decision-maker 
is one of many, the power of the environment is such that the 
decision-maker must act in the manner prescribed by that 
environment. Since both decision-maker and environment are 
decision-makers in the broadest sense, the system and sub­
system relationship may be noted. The power-holder is at a 
superordinate position in the decision hierarchy and makes 
choices on the basis of value premises. The power-subject, 
by being relatively more dependent on the superordinate for 
his values, makes choices based on factual interpretation of 
the facility of the choices for super-system goals.
The relationship among decision-maker, action, and 
goals has been expressed as a conditional probability. The 
decision-maker may evidence a preference for a particular 
action apart from that action's usefulness in achieving a 
specific goal. He also may choose goals which he has reason­
able expectations of attaining through actions which are per­
ceived to be available and facilitative in attaining those 
goals. The probability is conditioned by the decision-maker's
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perception of power. Since power is the ability to alter 
the probability of occurrence of a desired action, the 
decision-maker is influenced in his choice of goals by his 
perceived power to evoke the action which will achieve them. 
Further, if power has value of itself, the decision-maker 
will prefer those actions which are stimulated by an act of 
power .
Power enters the choice— action— outcome process of 
decision at all points in the process. Level of aspiration, 
or choice of outcome, is established on the basis of past 
adventures in power relations. Only those alternative courses 
of action are considered which the decision-maker has reason 
to believe can be executed. The ability to make effective 
molar decision resides in the power-holder, whether one or 
many, and derives from the control of resources essential to 
the value satisfaction of the molecular decision-makers, or 
power-subj ects.
Effect of Power on Decision Dynamics
Decision has been explained as the dynamic process by 
which undifferentiated potentiality is transformed into 
events which are expected to culminate in attainment of 
specific goals. Each event is composed of actions of goal- 
seeking participants and is organized as a power relation
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around the values of those participants. The event, which is 
molar to the occupants of that particular space-time region, 
is a molecular action in a larger event, which is also a 
power relation. Even the organization, limited here to that 
steady state which is directed toward designated goals, is 
but an event in the larger context of society.
The organizational decision is directed toward con­
structing an event on the basis of expectations concerning 
events which are both external and internal to the organiza­
tion. Although every event is characterized by a fluid con­
tinuity, perceived similarity of position observations of 
events under what appear to be similar conditions result in 
a mean-image. The mean-image on repeated observation is 
taken to be the essence of the event and forms the basis for 
expectations of those making the observation. But the mean- 
image is only one parameter of an event. Each event is a 
variable based on the variable actions of its constituent 
parts. The structure of the event can be adequately described 
only through inclusion of variability as well as the mean- 
image. Effective decision is a function of the combined 
variables called events. Effectiveness of decision, measured 
by comparison of desired and observed results, depends on the 
difference between the actual value of the event and its
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expected value. Since each action which has a part in deter­
mining an event is a function of the perceived value rein­
forcement of the actor, and since the ability to reinforce 
values is the source of power, every event may be observed 
to be a power structure. The event or power structure sub­
ject to position observation at a given time is jointly a 
function of the values of the structure components and the 
reinforcement perceived to be available from that structure.
It may be postulated that the greater the amount of 
power of the decision-maker, the more closely will the action 
pattern cluster about the mean-image. Also, the greater the 
power of the organization, the more closely will the mean- 
images of its internal events concentrate around the image 
desired by the organization. The decision process is actu­
ated by perceived changes in event images. Changes which are 
perceived as shifts in the mean-images are thought to be the 
result of shifts in values of the event components, and 
changes which are perceived as deviations from a constant 
mean-image are thought to be chance variations arising from 
a stable pattern of values. Reaction to change (decision) 
will depend on the nature of the changes perceived by the 
decision-maker plus the decision-maker's perception of power.
Changes which are recognized as deviations from a
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constant mean involve no redistribution of power. If power 
and authority are coterminous, the decis,ion-maker may accept 
the change provided it does not exceed the boundaries of the 
prescribed role, or, by being sole possessor of value rein­
forcement, the decision-maker may, through sanctions, restore 
the former, desired behavior. If, however, power and author­
ity do not coincide, the relevant alternative courses of 
action open to the decision-maker will be limited to those 
which he considers enforceable, which is tantamount to 
accepting role performance outside the boundaries of role 
prescription.
Changes which appear to be shifts in the mean of the 
event involve a change in values of event-constituents and 
will be accompanied by a redistribution of power unless the 
organization can avail itself of the new sources of value 
reinforcement. If environment restricts the sources of value 
reinforcement, organization alternative courses of action may 
be limited to the changed event, which is in essence a trans­
fer of power to the event itself. A possible consequence is 
a change in organizational goals to those which can be accom­
modated by the new events (a changed level of aspiration).
The decision-maker's perception of power may well dis­
tort his perception of change and thus influence the
v
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development of alternative lines of action. If authority is 
correctly perceived as coincidental with power, desired 
events differ from mean-images of events only as a result of 
limited capabilities of organization members. If desired 
events are vital to organization purpose, deviation of mean- 
image from the desired events cannot long endure and changes 
will be made in either goals or members. If, however, author­
ity is incorrectly perceived as synonymous with power, shifts 
in mean-images will be misconstrued as chance variations and 
attempts will be made to reinforce changed values with no 
longer acceptable rewards. Alternatives will be selected 
which are incompatible with the changed events, authority 
will be devoted to disciplinary sanctions, and alienation of 
identification will result. As the value systems of the 
organization and its members are dis-integrated, the power 
which accrues to authority will dissolve.
It might be added that authority always sows the seeds 
of its own destruction unless it remains vested in a single 
individual without delegation. Delegated authority is the 
delegated ability to reinforce values, and power accrues to 
the occupant of the position in which authority is vested. 
Only the purge can prevent power struggles from developing 
among those to whom authority is delegated in the absence of
104
a universal value which permeates and dominates the total 
organisation.
It is in the action phase of decision that power is 
usually thought to be most important/ for it is through 
power that actions are transformed into desired events. The 
amount of power which resides in a point of decision influ­
ences conformance with the goals of that decision-maker. But 
the actions which are effected at distant points from the 
alternative choice have been filtered through a series of 
power structures and possibly power struggles. The amount of 
conflict and consequent divergence of action is determined by 
the degree of integration of the value systems of the partici­
pating power structures. The closer the identification 
between successive hierarchical power centers, the more likely 
are the ultimate actions to develop into chosen events. 
Ultimate results, if they could be determined, would rest on 
ultimate actions, and final answers if they could be provided, 
would rest on the power structure of the organization.
In the dynamics of organization, neither ultimate 
answers, in the form of choices, nor ultimate results, in the 
form of terminal value satisfaction, can be determined. The 
organization must constantly make position-observations and 
re-evaluate its approach to ever-receding goals.
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It is maintained that this evaluation process must 
include consideration of the power structure of the organiza­
tion and that decision be directed toward continual redis­
tribution of power to accommodate for changed events in both 
the internal and external segments of the organizational 
environment.
Power as a Determinant of Participation
The aspects of participation in organization decision 
have been indicated to be twofold— organizational and indivi­
dual. From the organization standpoint individual partici­
pation is dependent on the essentiality of a particular 
behavior pattern within the capabilities of the individual.
The individual is willing to participate in the organization 
decision as he perceives the opportunity cost, measured in 
value reinforcement, to be satisfactory. As functional inter­
dependents , the individual contribution and the organizational 
inducement are determined within a power relation. The nature 
of the power relation will vary according to types of decisions 
that are required to carry out organizational purpose.
In certain organizations, and in certain areas of 
other organizations, a high degree of conformity to specified 
action is essential to either or both organizational and 
individual purpose. In other segments of society, the need
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may be for a relatively high level of creativity. Even a 
single individual, at different times or in different areas 
of responsibility, may be alternately expected to create and 
to conform. The ability of the organization to elicit 
creativity or conformity, as each is appropriate, is a func­
tion of the power relations bounded by the prescriptions of 
organizational and social roles.
In evoking compliance the organization depends on an 
authoritative statement of the prescriptions of the role and 
deference to the institutionalized part of power which ad­
heres to that role. The amount of lattitude permitted in 
each role is determined by the risk involved in obtaining a 
behavior pattern not included in the specific requirements 
for attaining organizational objectives. If the risk is 
great, such as loss of life of the actor or others, the 
amount of lattitude is severely restricted. On the other 
hand, if the risk is small, or the potential'reward to the 
organization from creativity is great, the organizational 
structure may be permissive of accumulations of power deriv­
ing from sources outside of authority.
Whether the organization promotes conformity or 
creativity, its ability to attain its goals rests on the 
capacity to reinforce the values of its members. Each of the
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participants is a power-seeker with reference to his personal 
goals but is a power-holder only insofar as he has authority 
to mediate rewards for others. He has secured power, but it 
is an empty box which can only feed on itself since it is 
only power to obtain the objectives of others. Yet every 
organization member enters the decision process according to 
his perception of the power he will obtain to satisfy his 
personal values. Power thus becomes the only effective check 
on power, and the organization decision is reduced to a power 
struggle in a power structure.
The organizational decision process is the mechanism 
by which the potential of resources is converted into an 
active program for goal attainment. The effectiveness of 
the decision process depends on the organization’s ability 
to elicit desired actions from the participants. In the 
dynamics of organizational activities, the resources enter 
the decision process as actions and events directed toward 
the satisfaction of separate system and sub-system goals.
Functional interdependence of the parts of the system and the 
total system create a power relationship which may stabilize 
into a power structure. Through stabilization the power 
structure promotes integration of the divergent goals of the
participants and the decision process is determined by the 
distribution of power in the structure.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The role of power in the formal organization has been 
treated under a variety of headings such as authority, force, 
discipline, control, and others. The usual procedure has 
been to equate power with one or the other of its companion 
concepts or to consider the advent of power into the organiza­
tion as a dysfunctional intrusion. In this paper, power is 
considered to be a variable in the organization which can be 
distinguished and analyzed apart from the more usual and 
somewhat more socially acceptable concepts.
Power is defined as the ability to alter the proba­
bility of occurrence of a desired action or event. This 
definition was chosen in preference to such definitions as 
"production of intended effect," and "probability of change" 
for two reasons. First, power as an ability expresses 
potentiality which is omitted from the past tense implication 
in production of intended effect. As potential, power can 
influence the actors in the organization social arena without
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actually being exercised. Second, where probability of 
change imparts an impersonal, passive impression, ability to 
change expresses personal potency which is action oriented.
As an action variable, power is a key variable in organiza­
tion, which is social interaction directed toward a specific 
goal or objective.
As a product of interaction, power has its source 
deeply imbedded in the value systems of the social actors of 
organization. Implicitly, a power relation has power-holders 
and power subjects. But the power-holder possesses power 
only if he is capable of permitting or denying the use of 
his possessions for the goal attainment of the power-subject. 
Neither possession of resources nor control of institutions 
is power in itself, but each is a potential source of power.
Power is based on the ability to mediate reward in 
the form of coveted possession. Through reward the power- 
holder can sanction, positively or negatively, the actions 
of the power-subject. If the prized possessions are institu­
tions of the organization, power is said to be based on 
legitimacy. If the power-holder is the object of emulation, 
power is based on identification. By employing sanctions, 
the power-holder may convert undifferentiated potential for 
power into a force for eliciting desired behavior.
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Power has certain conceptual properties which are 
implicit in its definition as the ability to alter the proba­
bility of occurrence of a desired action or event. A neces­
sary condition for power is social interaction. Unless the 
parties to a social relation have some mutual dependency for 
individual value satisfaction, power cannot exist. Power is 
the inequality which results from one social actor being 
interjected between other social actors and their objectives. 
Every social relation is a power relation and every power 
relation is a social relation.
As an inequality in a social relation, power has 
certain observable dimensions. The amount of power may be 
thought of as the measurable change in the probability of 
occurrence of a desired action. The scope of an actor's 
power is the range of behavior over which it can be exercised. 
Extension is the number of people over whom the actor has 
power. The added dimension of cost of power explains the 
feasibility of transforming potential into power.
Power always contains some meaning for the future and 
little meaning for the past. Power is a potential for action, 
and action is an expenditure of potential toward the realiza­
tion of some desired objective. Expenditures of power may be 
directed toward further accumulation of sources of power as
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well as in terminal satisfaction. In this sense, power may 
be "invested” or "consumed." As an investment, power is 
potential which is stored for future use.
The value systems of participants in the power-relation 
have been indicated to be the ultimate source of power. Inas­
much as the values of individuals may have similarities and 
differences, power may be either transitive or intransitive.
If the coveted resources which an actor possesses are gen­
eralized over a number of people having different values, 
power may possibly be a transitive variable. Authority as a 
component of power, is transitive to all those accepting the 
institutionalized values which authority comprises. The 
component of power residing in personal attributes is in­
transitive unless the personal attributes are also institu­
tionalized.
As an intransitive variable, power may be of limited 
usefulness to the power-holder faced with changing values of 
power-subjects. However, power is constantly being trans­
formed from one state into another. Naked power may be con­
verted into a milder form of coercive power and coercive 
power may result in an accumulation of resources which can 
be used as reward power. Potential for power is accumulated 
through the transformation of power from one type into
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another. If the values of the members of the power relation 
remain relatively constant, the accumulation of power- 
potential develops into a rather stable configuration, or 
power structure. It is the accumulation of power into struc­
tures which characterizes organization formation and growth.
When two or more persons combine resources, through 
interaction, an organization is formed. The possibility of 
accomplishing some purpose through combination which could 
not be accomplished individually causes individuals to sur­
render decisional autonomy to organization. The resultant 
structure is a power complex since it can reinforce some 
values which were not previously being satisfied. The power 
which accrues from the ability to satisfy values is dis­
tributed among the organization members to promote actions 
directed toward the specific objectives of the organization.
To obtain a continuity of performance some prescrip­
tions are placed on the activities of the individual power 
holders. The prescriptions are the basis of roles which the 
occupants of positions are expected to perform. The organi­
zation delegates power, in the form of authority, to the 
various centers in the organization structure in order to 
assure performance of the specific functions essential to 
organization objectives. If the occupants of functional
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roles perceive the organization to be the sole source of 
value satisfaction, power is dissolved without residue into 
authority, and the organization is simply a hierarchy of 
roles.
Generally, organization members are not insulated 
from the remainder of society. The members bring into the 
organization some values which are founded on a variety of 
social roles from the larger society. If some identification 
with external roles is maintained, the position occupant is 
likely to differ from the position prescription. If the 
difference is an additional source of value satisfaction to 
subordinate organization members, the position occupant has 
power deriving from authority plus power deriving from per­
sonal attributes. The power structure of the organization 
may thus be seen to vary with the degree and direction of 
identification. The whole structure of the organization may 
be described as a power hierarchy consisting of a system of 
power relations. The power hierarchy may be classified 
according to its degree of conformity to the authority hier­
archy.
An authoritative structure is said to consist of 
superior-subordinate relationship conforming to the role pre­
scriptions set forth by the organization. Permissive
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structure is described as having little or no role prescrip­
tion and may be thought of as an inverted pyramid of author­
ity. An intermediate type of structure is called collabora­
tive structure in which power and authority may diverge over 
a range of relationships. Most organizations will have 
specific areas of operation which are identifiable with any 
one of the three suggested types. The usefulness of the
i
classifications is not in type-casting the organization but 
in recognizing the variations which may occur in power 
structures.
Power is distributed through the power structure as a 
means of attaining organization goals and through these goals 
a means of reinforcing the values of organization members. 
Some of the power is distributed to obtain specific sets of 
behavior from the participants in keeping with a master plan 
of action. Insofar as the organization desires this specific 
behavior and nothing more, it may be said to promote conform­
ity. If the organization attempts to elicit a range of 
behavior patterns without specific designation, it is said to 
encourage creativity. The degree to which each form of be­
havior is desired depends on the nature of the organization 
goals and the risk involved in obtaining an unspecified 
behavior pattern.
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The amount, scope, and extension of power in the 
organization is determined by the functional interdependence 
of participants. If all members are totally dependent on 
association within the bounds of organization for value rein­
forcement, the relationship between members is a relationship 
without power. If total reciprocal dependency between organi­
zation and members could occur, the relation could be de­
scribed as bilateral monopoly and conflict would be resolved 
through bargaining. The bargaining process is a power rela­
tion which depends on the similarity of values of organization 
members. A homogeneous value system of members would tend to 
encourage the formation of the organization members into a 
collective bargaining bloc. The power relation in the 
bargaining situation will ultimately rest on the degrees of 
identification of the members with the operating organization 
and the bargaining agency; that is, on the way values are 
integrated in each of the organizations.
Every organization is an input-output system engaged 
in exchange relations with other input-output systems. In 
other words, each system is a power relation involved in a 
larger power relation, with the nature of the relationships 
being determined by the way in which values are integrated. 
Final answers, or equilibrium, are consummated only in the
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presence of an eternal, universal value.
In the absence of final answers, organization goals 
may be approached only through a continual process of decision. 
The decision process comprises the recognition of change, the 
development of alternative courses of action, the evolution 
of action, the evaluation of the results of action, and 
thence back to recognition of change. Organization decision 
never begins or ends and includes all the activities involved 
in choice of action and the evolution of outcome. The 
decision-maker includes all organization members that have a 
part in determining the effectiveness of decision.
The decision-maker operates in an environment which 
includes his goals and alternative courses of action. Goals 
are adjusted to conform to levels of attainment which the 
decision-maker can reasonably expect with the environment- 
limited set of alternatives. Alternatives are selected on the 
basis of their facility for established goals. The environ­
ment can be enlarged to include new goals and actions, but 
the enlargement process is accomplished in a power relation 
in which the decision-maker is a power-subject except when 
he is dictatorial or monopolistic. (A dictatorship or 
monopoly is subject to the same restrictions unless the 
environment is encapsulated or embraces all of society.)
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Every change in goals that requires "new" alternatives is in 
essence a search for new worlds to conquer after the manner 
of Alexander the Great. If the organization environment is 
taken as given, the decision-making process may be viewed as 
a continuing, mutual adjustment of goals and actions. Organi­
zational decision may be directed toward satisfying goals 
which are limited by the present state of the arts or toward 
enhancing the capacity for goal attainment by improving the 
state of the arts. Necessity may be both the mother and the 
daughter of invention.
Resources are available to the organization as a mass 
of undifferentiated potential. Through the decision-process 
in a power setting, potential is transformed into actions and 
events. The desirability of specific events may be deter­
mined by the facility of the events for organization goals.
The likelihood that the events will emerge from the mass is 
determined by the ability of the organization to reinforce 
the values of the resource-possessor. To the extent that 
values are integrated, the organization possesses the ability 
to alter the probabilities of occurrence of events which are 
essential to organization purpose. Decisions are made causa­
tive at distant points in the organization through distribu­
tion of power among power structures.
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Effective decision is a function of rational consider­
ations, such as those predominant in economic and statisti­
cal decision theory, and of social considerations, such as 
those founded on the moral and ethical beliefs of individuals. 
Rational effectiveness is limited by the extent of power in 
the hands of the delegates of the decision-making organism.
The power of delegates is circumscribed by the social norms 
of participants based on moral and ethical conviction. But 
enduring power may influence the direction of values placed 
on social acceptability. Thus decision may be seen to rest 
on the interaction of rationality, social control, and power. 
The fabric of decision is woven from socially prescribed 
yarn, according to rational design, on a loom of power.
In the final analysis, decisions are never "made." 
Choices are made, but decisions are evolved within the limits 
of a flexible environment of values, goals, and actions. The 
limits of the environment of decision and the effectiveness 
with which decision is evolved are functions of power— the 
ability to alter the probabilities of occurrence of actions, 
which are perceived to terminate in desired goals, through 
exclusive capacity for value reinforcement.
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